bookmark_borderFeser’s Case for God – Part 6: Ambiguity and Unclarity

LACK OF SPECIFICATION IN PREMISE (2)
The more I examine Chunk #1 of Feser’s Aristotelian argument for God, in Chapter 1 of Five Proofs of the Existence of God (hereafter: FPEG), the more ambiguous and unclear this part of the argument seems to be.
The problems begin with premise (2):

2. But change is the actualization of a potential.   (FPEG, Location 477 )

I initially interpreted premise (2) as asserting this more specific universal generalization:

2a.  ALL LOGICALLY POSSIBLE changes are instances of the actualization of a potential ATTRIBUTE of a SUBSTANCE.

One commenter who has closely followed this series of posts, and who appears to be familiar with Feser’s case for God, objects that Feser does not intend to discuss ALL LOGICALLY POSSIBLE changes here, and, in any case, that Feser’s argument works just fine if we reduce the scope of changes under consideration to something like ALL PHYSICALLY POSSIBLE changes, or ALL NATURAL CHANGES.  One might also reasonably consider reducing the quantifier from ALL to SOME (i.e. AT LEAST ONE).
So (2a), unlike (2), specifies a quantifier: “ALL”, and (2a), unlike (2), specifies the scope of changes under discussion: “LOGICALLY POSSIBLE”, and (2a), unlike (2), specifies the type of thing that can be potential:  an “ATTRIBUTE”, and (2a), unlike (2) specifies the type of thing that can have a potential: a “SUBSTANCE”.
While I don’t claim that (2a) is the correct or best interpretation of (2), it seems to me that (2a) is much more clear, and much less ambiguous than premise (2).  In fact, it seems to me that (2) is so unclear and so ambiguous that it is not possible to rationally evaluate whether premise (2) is TRUE or FALSE, but I am much more optimistic about rational evaluation of (2a).
 
DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF (2) HAVE DIFFERENT IMPACTS
Furthermore, in terms of evaluating Chunk #1 of Feser’s Aristotelian argument,  it makes a significant difference what we decide the intended quantifier is, and what we decide the intended scope of changes under discussion is, and what type of thing (or types of things) can be a potential, and what type of thing (or types of things) can have a potential.
Let’s consider some different possible interpretations of premise (2) and note how the different clarifications of this premise impact the soundness or validity or cogency of the first inference in Chunk #1.
 
ORIGINAL WORDING:

1. Change is a real feature of the world.

2. But change is the actualization of a potential.

3. So, the actualization of potential is a real feature of the world.  (FPEG, Location 477 )

VERSION I:

1a. At least one logically possible change has actually occurred.

2a. All logically possible changes that actually occur are instances of the actualization of a potential.

THEREFORE:

3a. At least one instance of the actualization of a potential has actually occurred.

This version appears to be logically VALID.  However, premise (2a) makes a very strong claim, and I have serious doubts about the truth of (2a), so this version might well be UNSOUND.  Furthermore, (2a) does not appear to be a reasonable interpretation of Feser, given other things that Feser has to say about the actualization of a potential.
VERSION II:

1a. At least one logically possible change has actually occurred.

2b. At least one logically possible change would be an instance of the actualization of a potential (if such a change were to actually occur).

THEREFORE:

3a. At least one instance of the actualization of a potential has actually occurred.

This version is clearly INVALID.  It has the same invalid logical form as this argument:

Some People are Tall people.

Some People are Short people.

THEREFORE:

Some Short people are Tall people.

VERSION III:

1a. At least one logically possible change has actually occurred.

2c. At least one logically possible change that has actually occurred is an instance of the actualization of a potential.

THEREFORE:

3a. At least one instance of the actualization of a potential has actually occurred.

Although this argument is logically VALID,  (2c) logically implies (3a) all by itself, because (2c) assumes or presupposes the truth of (1a), it is not a cogent argument.   Because (2c) implies (3a) all by itself, this appears to be a QUESTION BEGGING argument.  If one doubts (3a), then one will also doubt (2c), so it is inappropriate to use (2c) as the basis for establishing the truth of (3a).
VERSION IV:

1a. At least one logically possible change has actually occurred.

2d. All actual changes are instances of the actualization of a potential.

THEREFORE:

3a. At least one instance of the actualization of a potential has actually occurred.

Although this version is not formally valid, it does appear to be deductively valid, because (1a) implies that there has been at least one actual change, and in combination with (2d) that logically implies (3a).   However, (2d) is presumably known either by means of inductive reasoning from experienced examples of actual changes (and is thus an empirical generalization), or by means of analysis of concepts to confirm that (2d) as an analytic truth.
In order to know (2d) by induction from examples, we must first determine that at least one actual change was an instance of the actualization of a potential, but then that would require knowing (3a) to be true, so if (2d) is known by means of induction from experienced examples, then we must FIRST determine whether (3a) is true, in order to establish that (2d) is true, but then we would be reasoning in a circle to infer (3a) from (2d).
On the other hand, if we know (2d) on the basis of the analysis of concepts, independent from experience, then we cannot eliminate any logically possible changes from the scope of the phrase “actual changes”.  So, in order to determine that (2d) is an analytic truth, we need to first determine whether ALL LOGICALLY POSSIBLE CHANGES that actually occur must be instances of the actualization of a potential.  But that brings us back to VERSION I of the argument, and to the problem that (2a) is a very strong claim that appears to be highly dubious.
VERSION V:

1b. At least one physically possible change has actually occurred.

2e. All physically possible changes that actually occur are instances of the actualization of a potential.

THEREFORE:

3a. At least one instance of the actualization of a potential has actually occurred.

Again, we either know (2e) to be an empirical truth on the basis of induction from experience, or we know it to be an analytic truth on the basis of conceptual analysis.  In order to know (2e) to be true on the basis of induction from experience, we would need to first determine that one example of an actual change was an instance of the actualization of a potential, but that means that we would have to determine whether (3a) was true as an initial step towards evaluation of the truth of (2e).  So, if we turn around and later use (2e) as support for (3a), we would be reasoning in a circle.
Could we determine (2e) to be true by means of a conceptual analysis of this claim in order to show it to be an analytic truth?  Perhaps, we could.  Perhaps the concept of a “physically possible change” is best understood and best explained by reference to the idea that things have natural tendencies to change in specific ways in specific circumstances, and that the concepts of “potential” and “actualized” play key roles in such an analysis of the concept of a “physically possible change”.
Unfortunately,  I don’t think that Version V is what Feser had in mind in Chunk #1 of his Aristotelian argument.  In any case, Feser does not argue for a logical or conceptual tie between “physically possible changes” and “the actualization of a potential”, so although I think that Version V is more interesting than the other versions previously mentioned, I don’t think it reflects Feser’s thinking.
 
CLOSING REMARKS
There is a great deal of ambiguity and unclarity in premise (2) of Feser’s Aristotelian argument, which makes it difficult, if not impossible to rationally evaluate that premise.  Part of the unclarity results from a lack of specificity concerning the SCOPE of changes under discussion, and the QUANTIFICATION of claims about changes.  Different interpretations/versions of the initial inference of Chunk #1 of Feser’s Aristotelian argument show that there are different problems with the argument depending on which version/interpretation one adopts.
Furthermore, I have not said much about the problem of unclarity in relation to the type of thing(s) that could BE a potential, and the type of thing(s) that could HAVE a potential.  It makes a difference whether we are talking about potential attributes or potential substances or potential events or potential processes or ALL of these different sorts of potentials, or some combination of these different types of potentials.  It also makes a difference whether we are talking about substances having potentials or events having potentials or other types of things having potentials, or some combination of these different types of things having potentials. None of this is clearly specified by Feser.
Finally, Feser does not, at least not in Chapter 1, define what the phrase “a potential” means, nor does he define the phrase “actualizing a potential”, nor does he define the terms “substance” or “attribute”, which seem to be used or implied in his discussion of examples of the actualization of a potential.
At this point, I don’t see a way to rationally evaluate premise (2).  It stands in need of further specification and clarification.  I will probably move on to examine the rest of Chunk #1, leaving premise (2) as a claim that I cannot, at this point, evaluate as either true or false.  Perhaps, seeing what use Feser makes of premise (2) will help to clarify the meaning of this premise, and make it possible to rationally evaluate it later.

bookmark_borderFeser’s Case for God – Part 5: Potential Attributes vs. Contingent Attributes

POTENTIAL ATTRIBUTES VS. CONTINGENT ATTRIBUTES
I think (i.e. strongly suspect) it is important to understand the relationship between Edward Feser’s concept of the potential attributes of X and logical possibility.  Feser does not provide clarification on this point, at least not in Chapter 1 of his book Five Proofs of the Existence of God (hereafter: FPEG), where he introduces and makes use of the concept of the potential attributes of X.  So, I think it is worthwhile to try to figure this out for ourselves.
In particular, I think it is important to understand the relationship between Feser’s concept of  the potential attributes of X and the somewhat similar concept of the logically contingent attributes of X.  So, I’m going to make an effort to develop a clearer understanding of this subject.
 
DEFINITIONS CONCERNING LOGICAL POSSIBILITY
Logically Contingent Attribute:

An attribute A is a logically contingent attribute of X

IF AND ONLY IF

A is a logically possible attribute of X and A is NOT a logically necessary attribute of X.

Logically Possible Attribute:

An attribute A is a logically possible attribute of X

IF AND ONLY IF 

the statement that “X has attribute A” is a logically possible statement.

Logically Necessary Attribute:

An attribute A is a logically necessary attribute of X

IF AND ONLY IF 

the statement that “X has attribute A” is a logically necessary statement.

 
EXAMPLES OF TYPES OF ATTRIBUTES

  • Being married is NOT a logically possible attribute of a bachelor.
  • Being four sided is NOT a logically possible attribute of a triangle.
  • Being six feet tall is a logically possible attribute of a bachelor.
  • Having a right angle is a logically possible attribute of a triangle.
  • Being six feet tall is NOT a logically necessary attribute of a bachelor.
  • Having a right angle is NOT a logically necessary attribute of a triangle.
  • Being unmarried is a logically necessary attribute of a bachelor.
  • Being three sided is a logically necessary attribute of a triangle.
  • Being six feet tall is a logically contingent attribute of a bachelor (because this attribute is both logically possible and NOT logically necessary for a bachelor).
  • Having a right angle is a logically contingent attribute of a triangle (because this attribute is both logically possible and NOT logically necessary for a triangle).

 
EXCLUSION OF LOGICALLY NECESSARY ATTRIBUTES
I have defined the concept of a logically contingent attribute so that this EXCLUDES logically necessary attributes, because we are concerned with analysis of the concept of CHANGE, and there is an important feature of logically necessary attributes that relates to CHANGE.
It is important to note that a person who is a bachelor can, of course, become a married person.  But when he does so, he instantaneously and necessarily ceases to be a bachelor.  All bachelors are necessarily unmarried, but it is fairly easy for a bachelor to get married, and thus to cease being a bachelor.  What is ruled out here is the possibility of someone becoming a married person while remaining a bachelor.
A triangle cannot BECOME a three-sided plane figure, because the attribute of having three sides is a logically necessary attribute of a triangle.  We can take a square object (having four sides), remove one side of it, and connect the remaining sides to form a triangle (having just three sides).  So, the number of sides that an object or figure has can be CHANGED, but because triangles necessarily have three sides,  it is NOT logically possible for a triangle to change from having four sides to having three sides, because the initial four-sided object could not have been a triangle.  Nor can a figure change from having three sides to having four sides, and remain a triangle through that process.
 
TWO GENERAL CASES
There are TWO GENERAL CASES concerning the relationship between the referents of the phrases “the potential attributes of X” and “the logically contingent attributes of X”:
I.  The phrase “the potential attributes of X” refers to the same set of attributes as the phrase “the logically contingent attributes of X” (for any X, where X specifies a particular being or a category of beings).

OR

II. It is NOT the case that the phrase “the potential attributes of X” refers to the same set of attributes as the phrase “the logically contingent attributes of X” (for any X, where X specifies a particular being or a category of beings).
The “OR” here is EXCLUSIVE.  If CASE I holds, then CASE II does not hold.  If CASE II holds, then CASE I does not hold.
 
THINKING ABOUT CASE I
Let’s think about CASE I for minute.  If the phrase “the potential attributes of X” refers to the same set of attributes as the phrase “the logically contingent attributes of X”, then I don’t think I have any objection to Feser’s characterization of CHANGE in terms of a potential attribute of something becoming an actual attribute of that thing.
This characterization would, however, be trivial, obvious, and uninformative, because it just means that a CHANGE must start with a logically possible state of affairs and end up with a different logically possible state of affairs.  It is obvious and self-evident and trivial that a CHANGE cannot begin from a logically IMPOSSIBLE state of affairs, and it is obvious and trivial that a CHANGE cannot end up with a logically IMPOSSIBLE state of affairs.  But Feser seems to think that there is some significant, non-obvious, non-trivial truth in his characterization of the nature of CHANGE, so it seems to me that CASE I does not fit with Feser’s understanding of his characterization of CHANGE.
Furthermore,  when Feser asserts that hot coffee can CHANGE to cold coffee on the grounds that coldness is a potential attribute of coffee, he seems to be saying something MORE than just that it is logically possible for coffee to have the attribute of being cold.  He seems to be implying that there is something in the nature of coffee that makes it the sort of thing that can be cold.  This is more like the concept of physical possibility than the concept of logical possibility.
It is physically possible for coffee to be cold, and this physical possibility is more than mere logical possibility.  It is not physically possible for a man to walk on water, but it is logically possible for a man to walk on water.  Thus, the claim that it is physically possible to for X to do Y asserts MORE than the claim that it is logically possible for X to do Y.  Similarly, it seems that when Feser claims that “A is a potential attribute of X”  (e.g. “Coldness is a potential attribute of coffee”), he is asserting something MORE than just that the statement “A has attribute X”  (e.g. “This coffee is cold”) is a logically possible statement.
Therefore,  it seems to me that CASE I FAILS to provide an accurate characterization of the relationship between Feser’s concept of a potential attribute, and the concept of a logically contingent attribute.
 
ANALYSIS OF CASE II SCENARIOS
CASE II is a bit more complicated, because it encompasses three different scenarios, each of which needs to be considered and evaluated:
IIA.  At least one potential attribute of X is NOT a logically contingent attribute of X (AND it is NOT the case that at least one logically contingent attribute of X is NOT a potential attribute of X).

OR

IIB. At least one logically contingent attribute of X is NOT a potential attribute of X (AND it is NOT the case that at least one potential attribute of X is NOT a logically contingent attribute of X).

OR

IIIC. At least one potential attribute of X is NOT a logically contingent attribute of X, AND at least one logically contingent attribute of X is NOT a potential attribute of X.
The “OR” here is EXCLUSIVE.  If  Case IIA holds, then Case IIB and Case IIC do not.  If Case IIB holds, then Case IIA and Case IIC do not.  If Case IIC holds, then Case IIA and Case IIB do not.
 
CASE IIA
IIA.  At least one potential attribute of X is NOT a logically contingent attribute of X (AND it is NOT the case that at least one logically contingent attribute of X is NOT a potential attribute of X).
If there is a potential attribute of X that is NOT a logically contingent attribute of X, then either there is a potential attribute of X that is such that X cannot possibly have that attribute, or there is a potential attribute of X that is a logically necessary attribute of X.  Let’s consider the first alternative:
There is a potential attribute of X that is such that it is NOT logically possible for X to have that attribute.
This makes no sense in relation to the concept of a CHANGE.  For example, it is not logically possible for a triangle to have four sides.  To say that “having four sides” is a potential attribute of a triangle would be very misleading, to say the least.  Furthermore, since it is logically impossible for a triangle to have four sides, it is logically impossible for a triangle to ACTUALLY become four sided.  This is a “potential” that there is no possibility of ever being actualized.  It makes no sense to talk about CHANGE in terms of a “potential” that it is logically impossible to realize.
Let’s consider the second alternative:
There is a potential attribute of X that is a logically necessary attribute of X.
This also makes no sense in relation to the concept of a CHANGE.  For example, having three sides is a logically necessary attribute of a triangle, so a all triangles must always have three sides.  This means that it can never be the case that a triangle BECOMES three-sided.  In order to BECOME three-sided, something must start out not being three-sided.  So, it would be very misleading to say that having three sides is a “potential” attribute of a triangle, at the very least.  Furthermore, since all triangles must always have three sides, it is not logically possible for a triangle to BECOME three-sided, so it is not logically possible for the attribute of having three sides to be actualized for a triangle.  Any existing triangle will already have three sides.
CASE IIA FAILS to provide us with a concept of a “potential attribute of X” that can be used to reasonably analyze the concept of CHANGE as the actualization of a potential attribute.
 
CASE IIB
IIB. At least one logically contingent attribute of X is NOT a potential attribute of X (AND it is NOT the case that at least one potential attribute of X is NOT a logically contingent attribute of X).
In this case, there is a logical possibility that X lacks an attribute at one point in time and has that attribute at a later point in time, but this would be considered to be a case in which there was no CHANGE to X, because the attribute in question was not a “potential attribute” of X.
If X lacks an attribute at one point in time and has that attribute at a later point in time, then X has CHANGED.  It makes no difference whether obtaining that attribute was natural, or normal, or in keeping with the nature of X.  Even if that attribute is unnatural, or unusual, or abnormal for X, if X goes from lacking that attribute to having that attribute, then X has CHANGED.
This is similar to the distinction between logical possibility and physical possibility, and to the claim that the concept of CHANGE is restricted to physically possible events.  It is physically impossible to swim across the Atlantic ocean in one minute, but logically possible to do so.  If someone were to swim across the Atlantic ocean in one minute, then the location of that person has CHANGED, whether or not this event was physically possible.  The concept of CHANGE is NOT constrained by the limits of physical possibility; it is only constrained by the limits of logical possibility.  Similarly, the concept of CHANGE is NOT constrained by the limits of “potential attributes of X” if this is something narrower than the constraint of logical possibility (or “logically contingent attributes of X”).
CASE IIB FAILS to provide us with a concept of a “potential attribute of X” that can be used to reasonably analyze the concept of CHANGE as the actualization of a potential attribute.
 
CASE IIC
This third case has the problems of both CASE IIA and of CASE IIB.
CASE IIC FAILS to provide us with a concept of a “potential attribute of X” that can be used to reasonably analyze the concept of CHANGE as the actualization of a potential attribute.
 
CONCLUSION
The assumption that the phrase “the potential attributes of X” has the same referents as the phrase “the logically contingent attributes of X” makes Feser’s theory of CHANGE obvious and trivial, and it  FAILS to accurately interpret what Feser means by “potential attributes”.  So, CASE I  FAILS as an interpretation of a key concept in Feser’s metaphysical theory of CHANGE.
However, CASE II scenarios ALL FAIL to provide a concept of “the potential attributes of X” that can be used to reasonably analyze the concept of CHANGE.
Therefore, either Feser’s theory of CHANGE is obvious and trivial, or the key concept of “the potential attributes of X” makes it so that Feser FAILS to provide a reasonable analysis of the concept of CHANGE as the actualization of a potential attribute.

bookmark_borderFeser’s Case for God – Part 4: Coffee with Parmenides

THE ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE (3)
In his book Five Proofs of the Existence of God (hereafter: FPEG), Edward Feser presents an Aristotelian argument for God in Chapter 1.  In Part 2 of this series I divided that argument into seven chunks.  Chunk #1 consists of premises (1) through (14).  The first sub-argument in Chunk #1 goes like this:

  1. Change is a real feature of the world.
  2. But change is the actualization of a potential.
  3. So, the actualization of potential is a real feature of the world.

I am very skeptical and suspicious about premise (2), because acceptance of this premise seems to involve acceptance of a dubious metaphysical theory, or a significant portion of a dubious metaphysical theory.
In Part 3 of this series, I objected that (2) seems to be false, because the following alternative to (2) seems to be true:

2aBut change is when a logically possible state of affairs that was not an actual state of affairs becomes an actual state of affairs.

If there are (or could be) changes that are logically possible but that are physically impossible or beyond the natural “potential” of a thing, then (2a) would be TRUE, and (2) would be FALSE.  Premise (2) implies that there is no such thing as a change which is logically possible but that is beyond the natural “potential” of the thing that undergoes the change.  This would either mean that miracles cannot happen, or that miracles do not constitute changes.
COFFEE WITH PARMENIDES
Premise (2) imports an Aristotelian metaphysical theory (a theory about the nature of changes) into the argument.  One motivation for adopting this theory is that it provides, according to Feser, a powerful reply to Parmenides’ argument against the possibility of change.
Here is how Feser describes an argument by Parmenides:
Consider once again your coffee, which starts out hot and after sitting on the desk for a while grows cold.  You might say that the coldness of the coffee, which does not exist while the coffee is hot, comes into existence .  But now we have a problem, says Parmenides.  For if the coldness of the coffee was initially nonexistent, then at that point it was nothing;  and when it later comes into existence, it is then something.  But something can’t come from nothing.  So, the coldness of the coffee cannot come into existence, and thus, the coffee cannot grow cold.  Something similar could be said for any purported case of change–all of them would have to involve something coming from nothing, which is impossible.  Hence, concludes Parmenides, change cannot ever really occur.  (FPEG, Location 167)
Feser believes that Aristotle’s metaphysical theory about the nature of change provides a powerful reply to Parmenides:
There is another problem with Parmenides’ argument.  As the later Greek philosopher Aristotle pointed out, it is a mistake to think that change would have to involve something coming from nothing.  Go back to the coffee.  It is true that while the coffee is hot, the coldness is not actually present.  Still, it is there potentially in a way other qualities are not.  The coffee does not, after all, have the potential to fuel a gasoline engine, or to turn itself into chicken soup, or for that matter to morph into a live chicken and begin squawking.  But it does have the potential to grow cold, and it has various other potentials too… . That it has the potential to become cold while lacking certain other potentials shows that the coldness is not exactly nothing, even if it is not yet actual either.  (FPEG, Location 175)
But we do NOT need Aristotle’s metaphysical theory of change to have a powerful reply to Parmenides argument (as represented by Feser above).  All we need is a little bit of common sense.  Let’s have coffee with Parmenides and see if we can straighten him out.
BRADLEY:  Care for some coffee?
PARMENIDES:  Sure,  here is my coffee mug.
BRADLEY:  I see that your mug is empty.  I am now going to pour some hot coffee from this pitcher into your mug.
PARMENIDES:  Thank you.  I’m a bit hung over from the party last night, so coffee will help me to think more clearly about metaphysics and the nature of reality.
BRADLEY:  OK.  Great.   Your mug is now full of hot coffee.  That is clearly a CHANGE.  Your mug was empty just a few seconds ago, and now it is full of hot coffee!
PARMENIDES:  Hold on!  The mug is now full of coffee.  According to you it was empty only seconds ago.  That means that the fullness of the mug came into existence.  But then the fullness of the mug was initially non-existent, and at that point the fullness was NOTHING, and then when the fullness came into existence, it was SOMETHING.   But something can’t come from nothing.  So, the fullness of the mug cannot come into existence, and thus, the mug cannot become full.  It must either have always been full, or else it must always remain empty.
BRADLEY:  I don’t agree.  Let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that your basic assumption is correct and that is is impossible for something to come from nothing.  Your mug being full does involve something; it involves there being something in the mug, namely coffee.  That coffee is something, and based on your assumption, that coffee could NOT come from nothing.  However, the coffee did NOT come from nothing, it came from a pitcher that was full of coffee.  The coffee already existed, it just was in a different location.  When I poured the coffee into your mug, some coffee was transferred from the pitcher to the mug.  Therefore, your mug is full because it has coffee in it, and that coffee came from the pitcher; the coffee did NOT come from nothing.
PARMENIDES:  Perhaps you have a point.  Let me take a sip or two of this coffee and think on this for a while.  Hmmm.  This coffee is a little bitter.
BRADLEY:  Here, let me put some sugar in your coffee.
[BRADLEY takes a spoonful of sugar from a sugar bowl, puts the sugar into Parmenides’ coffee, and stirs the coffee for a few seconds.]
PARMENIDES:  Thank you.  The coffee is tastes much better now.
BRADLEY:  Right.  Just a few seconds ago your coffee had no sweetness, and now it has a bit of sweetness to it.  That is a CHANGE.  Your coffee has become slightly sweet.
PARMENIDES:  Not so fast!   The coffee is now sweet.  According to you it was NOT sweet only seconds ago.  That means that the sweetness of the coffee came into existence.  But then the sweetness of the coffee was initially non-existent, and at that point the sweetness was NOTHING, and then when the sweetness (allegedly) came into existence, it was SOMETHING.   But something can’t come from nothing.  So, the sweetness of the coffee cannot come into existence, and thus, the coffee cannot become sweet.  It must either have always been sweet, or else it must always remain without sweetness.
BRADLEY:  Once again, I disagree with your analysis.  Your coffee being sweet does involve something; it involves there being something in the coffee, namely sugar.  That sugar is something, and based on your assumption (that something cannot come from nothing), that sugar could NOT come from nothing.  However, the sugar did NOT come from nothing, it came from a sugar bowl that was full of sugar.  The sugar already existed, it just was in a different location.  When I put a spoonful of the sugar into your coffee, some sugar was transferred from the sugar bowl to the coffee in your mug.  Therefore, your coffee is sweet because it has sugar in it, and that sugar came from the sugar bowl; the sugar (and the sweetness) in your coffee did NOT come from nothing.
Note that BRADLEY’s replies to PARMENIDES did not require an appeal to Aristotle’s metaphysical theory of change, the replies only required an appeal to a bit of common sense.   The coffee in PARMENIDES’ mug did not come from nothing, it came from the pitcher of coffee.  The sugar in PARMENIDES’ coffee did not come from nothing, it came from the sugar bowl.
Duh.
 
 
 

bookmark_borderFeser’s Case for God – Part 3: Actualization of Potential

FESER TAKES OWNERSHIP OF THE FIVE ARGUMENTS
In Five Proofs of the Existence of God (hereafter: FPEG), Edward Feser presents five “proofs” or arguments, each of which was inspired by an historical philosopher (or two).  However,  Feser takes full ownership of these five arguments, so that none of these arguments is put forward as merely an historical presentation or as merely a scholarly interpretation of a specific argument by an historical philosopher:
In my earlier books The Last Superstition and Aquinas, and elsewhere, I approached questions of natural theology…by way of exposition and defense of what Aquinas had to say on the subject. (FPEG, Location 39, p.9-10)
…there is a need for an exposition and defense of all the most important arguments for God’s existence that is neither burdened with complex and often tedious issues of textual exegesis, nor preceded by any detailed metaphysical prolegomenon, but which simply gets straight to the heart of the argument and introduces any needed background metaphysical principles along the way. (FPEG, Location 53, p.10)
…the arguments [in this book] are all certainly inspired by several great thinkers of the past–in particular, by Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Aquinas, and Leibniz.  Indeed, I think that the proofs that I defend here capture what is essential to the arguments of those thinkers.  But I am not presenting an interpretation of any text to be found in the writings of any of these thinkers, and I am not claiming that any of these thinkers said or would agree with everything I have to say.  I defend an Aristotelian proof of God’s existence, but not Aristotle’s own proof, exactly; an Augustinian proof, but not an exegesis of anything Augustine himself actually wrote; and so forth. (FPEG, Location 59, p.11)
The five arguments are thus inspired by historical philosophers, but they are presented as Feser’s arguments, not as Aristotle’s argument, not as Augustine’s argument, not as Aquinas’s argument.  This is one more thing that Feser gets right.  A book that takes on the issue of the existence of God, especially one that provides a case for the existence of God, ought to contain only arguments of which the author takes ownership, and that the author sincerely believes to be good and solid arguments, or at least the best and strongest arguments available.
 
CHUNK NUMBER 1 OF THE ARISTOTELIAN ARGUMENT
The first chunk of Feser’s Aristotelian argument attempts to prove the following metaphysical claim:

14. So, there is a purely actual actualizer.  (FPEG, Location 493, p.36)

Although Chunk #1 can be viewed as being unique to the Aristotelian argument (because each argument attempts to prove the existence of a metaphysical being of a different type), Chunk #1 is still very important to how one evaluates ALL FIVE of the arguments presented by Feser.  This is because, the other four arguments are dependent upon the success of the rest of the Aristotelian argument (i.e. premises (15) through (49) ), and the rest of the Aristotelian argument has a dependency on Chunk #1.
The dependency of the rest of the Aristotelian argument on Chunk #1 is NOT a dependency on the TRUTH of premise (14), however.  Rather, it is in Chunk #1 that the concept of “a purely actual actualizer” is developed and clarified, and the rest of the Aristotelian argument is ABOUT the alleged attributes of “a purely actual actualizer”, so any unclarity, confusion, or logical problems with this concept are likely to impact the truth or the logic of the rest of the Aristotelian argument that follows after Chunk #1.
The rest of the Aristotelian argument could be logically valid, even if premise (14) was FALSE.  It could still be the case that IF “a purely actual actualizer” existed, THEN that being would have various key divine attributes (e.g. omnipotence, omniscience, being the cause of the existence of all things, etc.).   The point of the rest of the Aristotelian argument is to show that various key divine attributes are logically implied by the concept of “a purely actual actualizer”.  But what this concept logically implies, or does not imply, depends on what this concept MEANS.  So,  the success of the rest of the argument depends on the precise meaning of the phrase “a purely actual actualizer”, and the meaning of this phrase is developed and clarified in Chunk #1.
Therefore, Chunk #1 is NOT merely of significance in terms of our evaluation of the Aristotelian argument, but it is of significance to our evaluation of ALL FIVE of Feser’s arguments for the existence of God.
Here are the premises and inferences that Feser provides in support of claim (14):

  1. Change is a real feature of the world.
  2. But change is the actualization of a potential.
  3. So, the actualization of potential is a real feature of the world.
  4. No potential can be actualized unless something already actual actualizes it (the principle of causality).
  5. So, any change is caused by something already actual.
  6. The occurrence of any change C presupposes some thing or substance S which changes.
  7. the existence of S at any given moment itself presupposes the concurrent actualization of S’s potential for existence.
  8. So, any substance S has at any moment some actualizer A of its existence.
  9. A’s own existence at the moment it actualizes S itself presupposes either (a) the concurrent actualization of its own potential for existence or (b) A’s being purely actual.
  10. If A’s existence at the moment it actualizes S presupposes the concurrent actualization of its own potential for existence, then there exists a regress of concurrent actualizers that is either infinite or terminates in a purely actual actualizer.
  11. But such a regress of concurrent actualizers would constitute a hierarchical causal series, and such a series cannot regress infinitely.
  12. So, either A itself is a purely actual actualizer or there is a purely actual actualizer which terminates the regress that begins with the actualization of A.
  13. So, the occurrence of C and thus the existence of S at any given moment presupposes the existence of a purely actual actualizer.
  14. So, there is a purely actual actualizer. 

(FPEG, Location 477-493, p.35-36)
There is a lot going on here in Chunk #1, so it will probably take me a few posts to walk through this part of the Aristotelian argument.
 
THE FIRST SUB-CONCLUSION OF CHUNK #1
The first sub-conclusion that Feser argues for is this:

3. So, the actualization of potential is a real feature of the world. (FPEG, Location 477, p. 35)

Here is the summary argument for (3):

  1. Change is a real feature of the world.
  2. But change is the actualization of a potential.
  3. So, the actualization of potential is a real feature of the world.

 
I take it that the word “change” is NOT a technical term, but has its ordinary meaning, and thus there is no problem with premise (1); it is clearly and obviously true.
Premise (2) might seem fairly innocent at first blush, but I am deeply suspicious of this premise.  Here Feser is inserting some technical metaphysical concepts or terminology into the argument.  Feser makes no effort to hide this fact, and he provides some examples and clarifications of the terms “the actualization of” and “a potential”, so I’m NOT saying that Feser is trying to mislead anyone.  I’m just saying that we ought to be cautious about accepting premise (2), because it seems to involve acceptance of a philosophical point of view, of a metaphysical theory, or of a significant portion of a metaphysical theory.
Premise (3) clearly follows logically from the combination of (1) and (2), so the logic here is OK.
The only concern I have, so far, is with premise (2).  I doubt that (2) is true, but more importantly,  I do not, at this point, have a clear understanding of what (2) means.  What (2) means is crucial for understanding and evaluating both Chunk #1, and the rest of the Aristotelian argument that follows Chunk #1.  So, we cannot pass Go and collect $200 until we are clear about what premise (2) means.
 
CLARIFYING THE MEANING OF PREMISE (2)
Here is what Feser has to say in support of premise (2):
…it is a mistake to think that change would have to involve something coming from nothing.  Go back to the coffee [an example of a change given previously by Feser].  It is true that while the coffee is hot, the coldness is not actually present.  Still, it is there potentially in a way other qualities are not.  The coffee does not, after all, have the potential to fuel a gasoline engine, or to turn itself into chicken soup, or for that matter to morph into a chicken and begin squawking.  But it does have the potential to grow cold, and it has various other potentials too–to make you more alert if you drink it, to stain the floor if you spill it, and so forth.  That it has the potential to become cold while lacking other potentials shows that the coldness is not exactly nothing, even if it is not yet actual either.  
What change involves, then, is…the actualization of a potential.  The coffee has the potential to become cold, and after sitting out for a while, that potential is made actual.  This is not a case of something coming from nothing…because, again, a potential is not nothing.     (FPEG, Location 167 to 179, p.18)
Based on the above comments about the “actualization of a potential”, we can eliminate the following interpretation of (2):

2aBut change is when a logically possible state of affairs that was not an actual state of affairs becomes an actual state of affairs.

On this interpretation the coffee is hot at time T1, and it is logically possible for the coffee to be cold, but it is not actually the case that the coffee is cold at time T1.  However, if at time T2 the coffee is in fact cold, then a logical possibility that was previously not an actual state of affairs at time T1 has become an actual state of affairs at time T2.
First, let me explain why I think that (2a) is NOT what Feser means by premise (2).  In explaining the claim that the coffee has the potential to become cold, Feser says this:
The coffee does not, after all, have the potential to fuel a gasoline engine, or to turn itself into chicken soup, or for that matter to morph into a chicken and begin squawking.  (FPEG, Location 167, p.18)
Could some coffee turn “into chicken soup”?  This is NOT a physical possibility.  It would be contrary to the laws of nature for a cup of coffee to turn into chicken soup.  In fact, this would constitute a “miracle” if such an event were brought about by God.  However, as Christians often argue, miracles are logically possible even though they are physically impossible. God, being omnipotent, could change a cup of coffee into a cup of chicken soup.  This would be contrary to the laws of nature, contrary to the laws of chemistry, and thus it is a physically impossible event, but it is NOT a logical impossibility.  There is no logical contradiction involved in the claim that a cup of coffee turned into a cup of chicken soup.
 
AN OBJECTION TO PREMISE (2)
It seems to me that (2a) is TRUE.  But if (2a) is true, then (2) is FALSE.  So, it seems to me that (2) is FALSE.
Feser is clearly asserting that coffee does NOT have the “potential” to become chicken soup, but it is logically possible for coffee to become chicken soup, so having the “potential” to turn into chicken soup requires something MORE than just the logical possibility of turning into chicken soup.  Therefore, when Feser speaks of something having a “potential” this implies MORE than just a logical possibility.   It is logically possible for a cup of coffee to turn into a cup of chicken soup, but given Feser’s conception of a “potential”, a cup of coffee does NOT have the potential to turn into a cup of chicken soup.
This, it seems to me, creates a serious problem for Feser in relation to miracles.  God, being omnipotent, can turn a cup of coffee into a cup of chicken soup (this is clearly analogous to the NT miracle where Jesus allegedly turned water into wine).  This would constitute a miracle, in that such an event would be contrary to the laws of nature and would be brought about by God.  But if we accept (2), then we would be forced to conclude that NO CHANGE OCCURS when God turns the cup of coffee into a cup of chicken soup (or when Jesus turned the water into wine).  The cup of coffee had no “potential” to turn into a cup of chicken soup, so when God turned it into a cup of chicken soup, this would NOT be a case of actualizing “the potential” of the coffee to be chicken soup.  But since this is NOT a case of the potential of the coffee being actualized, it would not be a CHANGE, according to Feser’s concept of change.
But the idea that God performing the miracle of turning a cup of coffee into a cup of chicken soup (or Jesus turning water into wine) would NOT involve a CHANGE is absurd.  So, if we are going to accept the idea that miracles are logically possible, and that miracles like this involve a CHANGE, then we must accept (2a) and reject (2).
I doubt that I’m the first person to make this objection to Feser’s concept of CHANGE, so I’m going to stop here for now, and look to see if Feser addresses this objection somewhere in his book Five Proofs of the Existence of God.  
Before we can confidently conclude that we have a clear understanding of premise (2), we need to understand precisely how the meaning of (2) differs from (2a) and either how both (2) and (2a) could be true, or else WHY Feser believes (2a) to be false.  Once these questions have been answered, we should be in a good position to understand and to explicitly state a correct analysis of the meaning of (2).

bookmark_borderFeser’s Case for God – Part 2: Chunking Up the Aristotelian Argument

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ARISTOTELIAN ARGUMENT
In Chapter 1 of Five Proofs of the Existence of God (hereafter: FPEG),  Edward Feser presents his Aristotelian argument for the existence of God.  This is the most important argument in the book, because the other four arguments presented by Feser in later chapters all have a significant dependency on this first argument.
Specifically, the other four arguments rely on the assumption that a purely actual being must have various divine attributes (e.g. omnipotence, omniscience, being eternal, being fully good, etc.).  These assumptions are argued for in the Aristotelian argument, so if that part of the Aristotelian argument fails, then the remaining four arguments also fail.  If Feser fails to prove that a purely actual being must have various divine attributes, then ALL FIVE of his arguments for the existence of God FAIL.   Similarly, if Feser succeeds in proving that a purely actual being must have various divine attributes, then significant portions of the other four arguments also succeed.  So, a great deal rests on Feser’s Aristotelian argument.
 
THE BASIC FORM OF THE ARISTOTELIAN ARGUMENT
All five of Feser’s arguments for the existence of God have the same basic form:

I. There is exactly one being of type X.

II. IF there is exactly one being of type X, THEN God exists.

THEREFORE:

III. God exists.

Feser’s Aristotelian argument can be summarized using the same form:

IA. There is exactly one purely actual actualizer.

IIA. IF there is exactly one purely actual actualizer, THEN God exists.

THEREFORE:

III. God exists.

In Feser’s formal outline of the Aristotelian argument (FPEG,  p.35-37), there are fifty statements.  Statements (1) through (18) contain the reasoning supporting (IA), and statements (19) through (49) contain the reasoning supporting (IIA).  So, the Aristotelian argument can be divided into two large pieces.
 
CHUNKING UP THE ARISTOTELIAN ARGUMENT
I plan to examine somewhat smaller pieces of the argument.  To guide my critique, I will divide Feser’s Aristotelian argument into seven small-to-medium-size chunks:
I.  There is at least one purely actual actualizer: premises (1) through (14).
II. There cannot be more than one purely actual actualizer: premises (15) through (18).
III. Any purely actual actualizer must be immutable, eternal, immaterial, and incorporeal: premises (19) through (27).
IV. Any purely actual actualizer must be perfect and fully good: premises (28) through (32).
V. Any purely actual actualizer must be omnipotent: premises (33) through (37).
VI. Any purely actual actualizer must be  the cause of the existence of all beings, intelligent, and omniscient: premises (38) through (47).
VII. God exists IF AND ONLY IF there is exactly one purely actual actualizer and that  being is immutable, eternal, immaterial, incorporeal, perfect, fully good, omnipotent, the cause of the existence of all beings, intelligent, and omniscient: premise (49).
NOTE: Premise (48) is a conjunction that summarizes several previous sub-conclusions: (18), (21), (23), (25), (27), (29), (32), (37), (39), (44), and (47).
Given this way of dividing the Aristotelian argument up into seven chunks, I plan to write at least seven posts on this argument, and I might well need to write more than one post on some of these chunks, so it could easily take a dozen posts for me to critically examine this first, and most important argument in Feser’s case for the existence of God.

bookmark_borderHinman’s ABEAN Argument – Part 2: Objections to (11) and (1)

I. The Conclusion of the ABEAN Argument is UNCLEAR.
(ABEAN is an acronym for: “some Aspect of Being is Eternal And Necessary”, which is premise (4) of Hinman’s argument.)
The first thing that I look at when analyzing an argument is the conclusion of the argument.  Here is the conclusion of Hinman’s ABEAN argument:
11. Therefore, some people are warranted in believing in God.
This might not seem to be unclear at first glance, but the meaning of the phrase “believing in God” is indeed unclear.  One might think this means “believing that God exists”, but Hinman apparently does NOT believe that it is literally true that “God exists” (this is only metaphorically true in Hinman’s view), so this otherwise plausible interpretation of (11) is presumably incorrect.
The biggest problem here, though, is that Hinman defines the word “God” in a way that makes this concept completely unclear and obscure:
God: The transcendental signified, Universal truth at the top of the metaphysical hierarchy
If you want to make an already unclear concept even more unclear, then there is no better way to make things murky and incomprehensible than to go fishing around in the sewer consisting of the writings of the literary theorist Jacques Derrida.  If you aren’t familiar with Derrida’s notion of the “transcendental signified” don’t worry,  I found this brief and very helpful explanation that is sure to give you a firm grasp of this concept:
Upholding the notion of decentering, Derrida asserts that a “fixed” structure is a myth, and that all structures desire “immobility” beyond free play, which is impossible. The assumption of a centre expresses the desire for a “reassuring certitude” which stands beyond the subversive or threatening reach of any play which might disrupt the structure. The centre, that which gives stability, unity and closure to the structure, can be conceived as an “origin”, or a “purpose” — terms which invoke the notion of presence or logos that guarantee such stability and closure.
Now that we are all straight about what Derrida means by the “transcendental signified”, is anyone interested in buying a bottle of my Dr. B’s Amazing Elixir?  It cures baldness, AIDS,  acne, indigestion, and all forms of cancer, and I only charge $50.00 for an eight ounce bottle of it.  What a bargain, right?
I swear to GOB that I did not make up the above quoted paragraph.  You can read it for yourself on the LITERARY THEORY AND CRITICISM NOTES web page.  WARNING: The bullshit is so deep on that page, that you may want to put on a pair of hip waders before clicking on the link.
In short, I have no clue what Joe Hinman means by  the phrase “believe in God”.  I seriously doubt that Hinman has much of a clue either, and I would rather not immerse my mind into the raw sewage that spews out of the books and articles of many modern literary theorists, especially NOT those by Derrida.  So, the ABEAN argument as it stands is DOA.  It has no clear and intelligible conclusion.
The ABEAN argument is a FAILURE even before I examine any premises or any inferences in the argument. An argument cannot possibly FAIL any faster than this one has.
II.  Various Problems with Premise (1) of the ABEAN Argument
Since I have no clue what the conclusion of ABEAN asserts,  I’m just going to start from the start, and work my way through the argument, step-by-step, noting any problems I discover along the way.
The first premise of the argument, like the conclusion, is unclear, at least initially:
1. All naturalistic phenomena are contingent and temporal.
In a philosophical argument, when there is a premise of the form “ALL Xs  ARE Ys”, a premise that is a universal generalization, one needs to determine whether this is supposed to be an inductive generalization based on experience, or (alternatively) an a priori claim.  If it is supposed to be an a priori claim, then is it an analytic truth (like “All triangles have three sides”) or  some other sort of a priori claim (like a synthetic a priori claim)?  More on this point later.
All three concepts in this premise are unclear, at least initially: “naturalistic phenomena”, “contingent”, and “temporal”.
However, Hinman does provide a fairly clear definition of the characteristic of being “contingent”:
Contingency:  That which can cease or might have failed to exist.
The characteristic of being “contingent” contrasts with the characteristic of being “necessary”:
Necessity: That which cannot cease or fail to exist.
Here are standard-form definitions of “contingent” and “necessary”, based on what Hinman says about these concepts:

DEFINITION OF “CONTINGENT”:

X is contingent IF AND ONLY IF either (a) X can cease to exist, or (b) X can fail to exist.

DEFINITION OF “NECESSARY”:

X is necessary IF AND ONLY IF either (a) X cannot cease to exist, or (b) X cannot fail to exist.

These two concepts are supposed to create a dichotomy, a set of two categories which are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive of all possibilities.  But Hinman’s definitions do NOT create a dichotomy.  That is because something can “fail to exist” that cannot “cease to exist”. (There may be other problems as well.  This is just the problem that I noticed right away.)
For example,  a four-sided triangle CAN “fail to exist” (since it is impossible for such a thing to exist), but a four-sided triangle CANNOT “cease to exist” (because it can never exist–not even for a fraction of a second–it can never cease to exist).  Based on Hinman’s definition of “contingent”, a four-sided triangle is “contingent” because it CAN “fail to exist”.  Based on Hinman’s definition of “necessary”, a four-sided triangle is “necessary” because it CANNOT “cease to exist”.  Thus, based on Hinman’s definitions, a four-sided triangle is BOTH “contingent” AND “necessary”.  Therefore, the categories of “necessary” and “contingent” do NOT constitute a dichotomy.  These two categories overlap each other; they are NOT mutually exclusive concepts.
The fact that something is contingent, therefore, does NOT imply that it is not necessary.  The fact that something is necessary, does NOT imply that it is not contingent.  Thus, even if I granted, for the sake of argument, that ALL “naturalistic phenomena” were contingent, that does NOT imply that no “naturalistic phenomena” are necessary.  Given Hinman’s definitions, these categories are NOT mutually exclusive, so the fact that something falls into one category does NOT exclude the possibility that it ALSO falls into the other category.
Hinman’s inference from premise (1) and premise (4) to the sub-conclusion (5) is logically invalid, because this inference ASSUMES that the categories of “contingent” and “necessary” constitute a dichotomy, that they are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, but this assumption is FALSE, so the the inference to (5) is INVALID.
What does Hinman mean by the term “temporal”?  The category of “temporal” contrasts with the category of “eternal”.  Once again, it appears that Hinman takes these two concepts to be a dichotomy, to be mutually exclusive categories, and to be jointly exhaustive categories.
But Hinman fails to provide a definition of either “temporal” or “eternal”, so we have no reasonable way to determine whether these concepts really do constitute a dichotomy, or if Hinman is just as confused in this case as he was in the case of the false dichotomy between “contingent” and “necessary”.  Fool me once, shame on you.  Fool me twice, shame on me.  We should presume that Hinman is just as confused and unclear about this set of categories as we have seen him to be about the previous set of categories.  Unless and until he puts forward clear definitions of “temporal” and “eternal”, we should remain doubtful about the assumption that these concepts constitute a dichotomy, and thus we should remain doubtful about any inferences that Hinman makes based on either of these UNCLEAR concepts.
What does Hinman mean by the phrase “naturalistic phenomena”?  This phrase is obviously problematic and in need of clarification.  Hinman does discuss this concept, but does NOT provide a clear definition of this term.  What he says is summed up in this one sentence:
Thus I equate naturalistic with nature and nature with S/TC and phyiscal [sic] law. 
(S/TC  means: Space/Time Continuum)
The term “nature” is hardly much clearer than “naturalistic” and reference to the space/time continuum and physical law might provide a clue about what he means, but this is an inadequate clarification of a key concept in the argument.  Without providing a clear definition of this key term, I don’t see how anyone can rationally evaluate premise (1) as being true or false.
One might assume that because this sounds like other cosmological arguments, that this argument is based on an empirical claim, and that premise (1) is at least one of the empirical claims in this argument.  However, Hinman makes a comment that casts doubt on that reasonable assumption:
The very concept of nature is that of a contingent temporal realm. 
This comment comes very close to asserting that premise (1) is an analytic truth, and thus NOT an empirical claim.  So, Hinman needs to be clearer on this crucial point.  Is premise (1) to be interpreted as an inductive generalization based on experience? or is it an a priori claim?  If it is an a priori claim, then is it supposed to be an analytic truth? or some other kind of a priori claim?  This is yet another problem that makes premise (1) an UNCLEAR statement.  We need to know what sort of claim it is, in order to properly evaluate this claim.  But it is less than clear whether this is supposed to be an empirical claim or an a priori claim.
Premise (1) is hopelessly unclear and confused.  The meaning of the word “contingent” is clear, but is confused, because Hinman mistakenly believes that the categories of “contingent” and “necessary” constitute a dichotomy.  Because of this confusion, the inference from (1) and (4) to (5) is INVALID.  The meaning of the word “temporal” is unclear, because this is a problematic word that is left undefined.  The meaning of the phrase “naturalistic phenomena” is unclear as well.  Hinman makes an effort at clarifying the meaning of this phrase, but his effort falls short; he needs to provide a clear definition of this problematic phrase.  There is also some ambiguity as to the type of claim that Hinman intends to be making.  Is this premise an empirical claim or is it an a priori claim?
III. A Counter Argument from a Skeptical Point of View
Hinman has taken on the burden of proof, which is as things should be.  I made no promise to put forward an argument against the existence of God.  However, in reflecting on the ABEAN argument, I do have some thoughts that constitute an alternative way of thinking about the alleged “contingency” of the universe or of natural phenomena, so I’m going to give Hinman (and the other readers of this post) something to consider (and to criticize) other than my objections to his ABEAN argument:

1. A true explanation of an event requires a true claim of the form “A change in X caused a change in Y”.

2. The Big Bang can be thought of as an event, as “a change in Y”.

3. There is a true explanation for every event, including the Big Bang.

THEREFORE:

4. The Big Bang was caused by a “change in X”, by a change in something. (from 1, 2, and 3)

 5. God, if God exists, is eternal (meaning “God is outside of time”).

 6. Something can undergo change ONLY IF it exists in time.

THEREFORE:  

7. God, if God exists, cannot undergo change. (from 5 and 6)

8. God caused the Big Bang ONLY IF God can undergo change. (from 4)

THEREFORE:

9. It is NOT the case that God caused the Big Bang. (from 7 and 8)

Another way of expressing basically the same point is that the mere existence of God is NOT sufficient to explain the coming into existence of the universe.  There must be an EVENT that caused the universe to come into existence.  If God caused the universe to come into existence, then God did this by creating the universe, by willing the universe to come into existence.  But “creating” and “willing” are activities that require God to undergo change.  So, God CANNOT be the cause of the coming into existence of the universe unless God can undergo change.
But Hinman’s concept of God, as with Norman Geisler and Thomas Aquinas, is that God is outside of time and completely unchanging.  Hinman’s God, and the God of Geisler and of Aquinas, does NOT exist, because their concept of God is incoherent, it contains a logical contradiction: “God caused the universe to begin to exist AND God cannot undergo change”.
NOTE:
There are many more premises and inferences to analyze and evaluate in Hinman’s ABEAN argument, and I’m fairly certain that I will not be able to get to all of the remaining premises and inferences in my next post on ABEAN.  I have agreed to limit myself to just two posts containing my initial objections to ABEAN, so I do not expect my critique to be comprehensive.  However, there are enough problems with just the conclusion and the first premise to sink this argument, so I expect that a second post will be more than enough to justify rejection of the ABEAN argument.