bookmark_borderKreeft’s Case for God – Part 12: The Argument for (3a)

THE EVALUATION OF ARGUMENT #1 SO FAR
In Part 11 we saw that Argument #1 is UNSOUND, because it is based on the premise (F), and because Kreeft provides no support for (F), and because we have good reason to believe (F) to be FALSE.
In this current post, I will examine the core argument in support of premise (8a), the other main premise of Argument #1.
 
THE CORE ARGUMENT SUPPORTING (8a)
Here is premise (8a):

8a. There is exactly ONE being outside the material universe and that being is the unchanging Source of change.

Here is what appears to be the core argument in the reasoning supporting (8a):

D. Anything that is outside the material universe is outside matter, space and time.

3a. There is something outside the material universe.

THEREFORE:

6a. There is exactly ONE being outside the material universe and that being is outside matter, space and time.

In Part 11 I argued that this core argument is logically INVALID, and thus that this core argument is UNSOUND.
So at this point, the single most important premise of Argument #1, premise (F), is FALSE, and the next most important premise of Argument #1, premise (8a), is supported by an UNSOUND core argument, leaving us without any good reason to believe (8a) to be true.
Another question about this core argument, is whether the premises are true or false.  Kreeft provides arguments in support of both premise (D) and premise (3a).   I’m not going to examine the argument supporting (D), because I interpret (D) as a conceptual claim, as a partial analysis of the meaning of the phrase “outside the material universe”.  Furthermore,  I’m willing to accept (D) as an implication of a stipulated definition.  In Part 11, I presented what I take to be the intended meaning of the phrase “outside the material universe”.  Based on that definition,  (D) would be an analytic truth, because (D) expresses logical implications of that definition.  Thus, there is no need to examine the argument for (D).  I accept (D) as a true analytic claim.
However, the other premise of the core argument in support of (6a) and (8a), namely premise (3a), is controversial and questionable.  So, if Kreeft fails to provide a solid argument that shows (3a) to be true, then premise (3a) remains questionable at best, and we would have another reason to reject this core argument.  So, we need to examine Kreeft’s sub-argument for (3a).
 
THE ARGUMENT FOR PREMISE (3a)

1. IF there is nothing outside the material universe, THEN there is nothing that can cause the material universe to change.

A. IF there is nothing that can cause the material universe to change, THEN the material universe does not change.

THEREFORE:

B. IF there is nothing outside the material universe, THEN the material universe does not change.

2. But the material universe does change.

THEREFORE:

C. It is NOT the case that there is nothing outside the material universe.

THEREFORE:

3a. There is something outside the material universe.

The logic of this sub-argument for (3a) is VALID, so the evaluation of this argument depends on the evaluation of these two key premises: (B) and (2).  I take it that premise (2) is TRUE, given that any change to a human person or plant or animal or to a physical object constitutes a “change to the material universe” (that is how Kreeft appears to be using that phrase).   So, the evaluation of this argument for (3a) depends on the evaluation of premise (B).  Since the evaluation of premise (B) depends largely on our evaluation of  premises (1) and (A), which are given in support of (B), our evaluation of the argument for (3a) depends largely on what we think about premise (1) and premise (A).
 
EVALUATION OF PREMISE (1)
Here is premise (1) of Argument #1:

1. IF there is nothing outside the material universe, THEN there is nothing that can cause the material universe to change.

What does the phrase “cause the universe to change” mean?  Kreeft doesn’t explain or clarify the meaning of this key phrase.  However, the evidence that he gives to show that the universe does in fact change shows that he includes ordinary changes to people and objects on this planet:
The material world we know is a world of change.  This young woman came to be 5’2″ tall, but she was not always that height.  The great oak tree before us grew from the tiniest acorn. (HCA, p.50)
Since the evidence supporting the claim that the “material world we know is a world of change” is that ordinary changes to people and things inside the material world occur, the phrase “the material universe changed” MUST include circumstances where some person or thing inside the material universe changes.  In other words, whenever some person or thing inside the material universe changes, Kreeft would infer from this fact that “the material universe has changed”.  But in that case, premise (1) is FALSE, because ordinary changes to individual people and objects inside the material universe can obviously be caused by other individual people or objects that exist inside the material universe.
For example, if my hand hits a glass of milk, and the glass is knocked over,  and the milk spills, there is no need to posit the existence of something “outside the material universe” as the cause of that spilled milk.  The milk spilled as a result of my hand knocking the glass over.  My arm and my hand are things that are inside the material universe, and the motion of my arm and hand caused the glass to move and the milk to spill.  This spilling of the milk is, based on how Kreeft uses the phrase, an example of a “change to the material universe”, but it is a change that was caused by physical things and events that are inside the material universe.  Therefore, even if there were nothing outside the material universe, this particular change to the material universe (i.e. the spilling of milk) could still occur, because it could be caused by some physical event or object that is inside the material universe (i.e. my hand knocking a glass full of milk).  Thus, premise (1) is FALSE.  Since premise (1) is FALSE, this argument in support of (3a) is UNSOUND, and (3a) remains unsupported and dubious.
But what about the need for a “first cause”? Something must have caused my hand to move so that it hit the glass of milk.  And whatever caused my hand to move must have also had a cause, and so on.  This tracing of causes cannot go on for infinity (some would say), so there must be a first cause that started this chain of events and changes.  But Aquinas does NOT deny the possibility that the universe is eternal, that the universe (and changes in the universe) has always existed (and have always occurred).
Aquinas does believe that the universe had a beginning and is of finite age, but he believed this on the basis of divine revelation, not on the basis of philosophical reasoning.  He admitted that as far as reason and philosophy are concerned, it is possible that the universe has always existed.  But if the universe has always existed, then there could indeed be infinite chains of cause and effect, one physical event causing another physical event, causing another, and so on, without any “first event” at the beginning of a chain of events, because some chains of events may be infinite and have no beginning.
 
EVALUATION OF PREMISE (A)
Here is premise (A) from Argument #1:

A. IF there is nothing that can cause the material universe to change, THEN the material universe does not change.

Premise (A) seems plausible initially.  However, it is based on a very general metaphysical principle:

MP1. Every change to the material universe must be caused to occur by some existing thing. 

One might reasonably doubt this very general principle.  For example, radioactive decay appears to be random.  There is apparently no prior physical event that triggers the radioactive decay event.  So there does not seem to be “a thing” that causes the decay to occur at the specific time that it occurs.  It appears to be the case that while most ordinary changes are caused or triggered by some existing thing (i.e. by a change to some existing thing), there are also some changes that don’t follow this pattern, and that occur apart from being caused by some other existing thing.
Because the plausibility of (A) depends on (MP1), and because (MP1) appears to be FALSE, premise (A) becomes implausible.  The falsehood of (MP1) does not prove that (A) is false, but it does cast serious doubt on premise (A).
 
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT PREMISE (3a)
The argument for (3a) is logically VALID, and premise (2) seems clearly to be TRUE, so how we evaluate this argument depends on our evaluation of premise (1) and premise (A).  I have argued above that premise (1) is FALSE, and that premise (A) is dubious, so we have good reason to reject the argument for (3a) as UNSOUND.
I am tempted to say that (3a) remains dubious, because Kreeft has not provided any good reason to believe that (3a) is TRUE.  However, (3a) might well be true, despite the failure of Kreeft’s argument for (3a).
Numbers appear to be “outside the material universe”.  The number five is NOT made of matter or energy.  The number five does NOT have any spatial characteristics (no size, no shape, no position in space).  The number five does not have any temporal characteristics (it has no beginning, no end, no duration, and is unaffected by the passing of time).  The number five thus appears to be something that is outside matter, and outside space, and outside time; therefore, the number five is “outside the material universe”.  Thus, (3a) appears to be TRUE, even though Kreeft’s argument for (3a) FAILS.
One important point to note about this concession that (3a) appears to be TRUE:  if my reasoning is correct, then the same reasoning can be used to PROVE that (6a) is FALSE and that (8a) is FALSE.   There are, afterall, many numbers, not just one number.  Thus, there are MANY things that are “outside the material universe”, such as the number one, the number two, the number three, etc.  Therefore, premise (8a) is not just dubious, it is (according to this reasoning) FALSE, and we can PROVE it to be false.
If my reasoning about numbers is correct, then we can PROVE (6a) and (8a) to be FALSE.  If my reasoning about numbers is incorrect, then (3a) remains dubious and so does (8a),  since Kreeft has failed to provide us with a good reason to believe (3a) to be true.  So, (8a) is either false or it is at least dubious.
 
PROBLEMS WITH ARGUMENT #1

  • The single most important premise of Argument #1, namely (F), is left UNSTATED and UNSUPPORTED.
  • The single most important premise of Argument #1, namely (F), appears to be FALSE.
  • The second most important premise of Argument #1, namely (8a), is supported by an INVALID core argument.
  • Although both premises of the core argument supporting the second most important premise of Argument #1, namely (8a), appear to be TRUE, the very reason why one of those premises, namely (3a), appears to be TRUE shows that (6a) is FALSE and that (8a) is FALSE.

In short, the Argument from Change, one of the five first arguments for the existence of God in Kreeft’s case for God, an argument which is presumably one of the strongest and best arguments for God (in Kreeft’s view), is an UNSOUND argument that is based on two key premises that are both FALSE.

bookmark_borderKreeft’s Case for God – Part 11: Evaluation of Argument #1

THE CONTEXT
Peter Kreeft and his co-author Ronald Tacelli open their Handbook of Christian Apologetics  (hereafter: HCA) with these words about their “reasons for writing this book”:

  1. We are certain that the Christian faith is true.
  2. We are only a little less certain that the very best thing we can possibly do for others is to persuade them of this truth, in which there is joy and peace and love incomparable in this world, and infinite and incomprehensible in the next. … (HCA, p.7)

Kreeft and Tacelli believe that heaven and hell are in the balance for every human being, when it comes to acceptance or rejection of “the Christian faith”.  So, it is very important that they try “to persuade” other people to accept the Christian faith in order for those people to gain a better life now, and a wonderful eternal life in heaven after death, and to avoid a life of eternal misery in hell.
Belief in the existence of God is one of the most basic beliefs in the Christian faith.  If God does NOT exist, then the Christian faith is just a fantasy.  Most of Christian theology rests upon the belief that God exists.  So, if Kreeft is to be successful in persuading others to accept the Christian faith, job number one is to provide good and solid arguments for the existence of God.  So, it is no surprise that after two introductory chapters (one on the idea of “apologetics” and another on the idea of “faith”) the very first Christian belief that Kreeft attempts to prove or show to be true is the belief that God exists.
As I have argued in previous posts, it appears that Kreeft has put his best foot forward by placing his best and strongest arguments for God up front in his case.  So, the first five arguments in Kreeft’s chapter containing twenty arguments for God, are presumably arguments that Kreeft takes to be the strongest and best arguments in his case for God.  If the first five arguments ALL FAIL, then we have good reason to suspect that his entire case will fail as well.
I have previously shown that the last ten arguments in his case all FAIL, so we have reason to suspect that his first five arguments will also fail.  But since these are arguments that he takes to be the best and strongest, we need to carefully examine and evaluate these first five arguments, in case one or more of them is in fact a good and solid argument for God.
 
THE CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENT #1
Here is the explicitly stated conclusion of Argument #1: “…this being outside the universe…is the unchanging Source of change.” (HCA, p.51).  I have re-stated this claim to clarify it a bit:
8a. There is exactly ONE being outside the material universe and that being is the unchanging Source of change.
One of the first things I look at when analyzing an argument is the conclusion of the argument.  Argument #1 is presumably one of the very best and strongest arguments for God, in the view of Peter Kreeft.  But there is an OBVIOUS and SERIOUS problem with Argument #1: The conclusion does not mention God!
In fact, the word “God” does not appear in anywhere in this argument.  How can Argument #1 be a strong and clear argument for the existence of God, if it never once mentions God?  In order for an argument to be a clear and strong argument for the existence of God, the conclusion of the argument should be that “God exists” or “There is a God”.   Argument #1 fails to satisfy this basic and obvious requirement.
We can fix this obviously defective argument by adding yet another  premise to fill in the logical gap:
(F) IF there is exactly ONE being outside the material universe and that being is the unchanging Source of  change, THEN God exists. 
But this additional premise is highly questionable and, as is seen in Edward Feser’s version of the Argument from Change (in Chapter 1 of Five Proofs of the Existence of God), a fairly long and complex argument needs to be presented in order to support this questionable premise.
In Feser’s presentation of the Argument from Change, MOST of that argument (over 70% of it) is given in support of this one premise (or one very similar to it).  Feser’s presentation of the Argument from Change is a fairly accurate representation of the reasoning of Aquinas; it is also the case that MOST of Aquinas’s case for God is focused on establishing this premise (or one very similar to it).
So, Kreeft left out what appears to be the single most important premise in the Argument from Change.  Kreeft is attempting to save us from an eternity of misery in hell and he is presenting what he thinks is one of his very best and strongest arguments for the most basic belief of the Christian faith, and yet somehow he cannot manage to clearly state the conclusion that “God exists” nor does he manage to explicitly state or provide support for what appears to be the single most important premise of this argument.
Furthermore, there is good reason to believe that (F) is FALSE.   God is a person, if God exists.  But a person cannot be an “unchanging” being, so the existence of an “unchanging” being does NOT imply the existence of God.  In fact, if the phrase “the unchanging Source of change” is supposed to be a reference to the CREATOR of the universe, then the antecedent of (F), i.e. “there is exactly ONE being outside the material universe and that being is the unchanging Source of  change”,  implies that the CREATOR of the universe is unchanging and thus not a person.  But if the CREATOR is not a person, then it follows that God does not exist.  So, to assert that “there is exactly ONE being that is the unchanging Source of change” appears to imply that God does not exist.
I realize that many theologians and philosophers of religion would argue either that (a) God is not a person, or that (b) it is possible for a person to be an unchanging being.  However, both of these positions seem very implausible, so I have serious doubts about premise (F).  In order to adequately argue for (F), one must not only provide strong arguments to support (F), but one must also explain either how God can be a non-person, or else explain how an unchanging being can be a person.
If I die and appear before God and am asked why I rejected Christianity,  I’m going to point to Chapter 3 of HCA, and say:
You sent this incompetent philosopher to persuade me that the Christian faith is true,  so what did you expect me to do?  Blindly accept arguments that are complete crap? Arguments that don’t even state the conclusion on the main question at issue?  Arguments that fail to state the single most important premise of the argument, and that fail to provide support for the single most important premise of the argument?  Screw that!  I’m not going to pretend to be a freaking IDIOT just so that you will let me into heaven.  No thank you.  
An argument that does not end with the conclusion that “God exists” and that never even mentions God does NOT constitute a strong argument for God, especially when such an argument fails to state or defend the single most important premise in that argument, namely a premise that links the explicitly stated conclusion (8a) to the conclusion that actually matters: “God exists”.
Without any further analysis or critique, I can see that the Argument from Change, as presented by Kreeft is CRAP, because the success of the argument depends heavily on the DUBIOUS unstated premise (F), which in order for it to be rationally supported would require many further sub-arguments (at least a half-dozen further sub-arguments), and Kreeft has made no attempt to provide any of these additional sub-arguments to support premise (F).  Given that Kreeft makes no attempt to defend the dubious claim made by premise (F), and given that (F) is the most important, the most crucial, premise in the Argument from Change, this argument FAILS to provide any significant reason to believe that God exists.
These are just a couple of several problems with Argument #1, as we shall see.
Another serious problem with this argument is that (8a) is very unclear, even after my efforts to improve the clarity of this premise.  This premise contains at least two unclear phrases:  “outside the material universe” and “the…Source of change”.  The phrase “the…Source of change” pops up out of nowhere; this phrase does not occur anywhere else in the argument, and Kreeft provides no definition or clarification of what this phrase means.  The phrase “outside the material universe” arises from earlier premises, so I will deal with the unclarity of that phrase when I evaluate previous premises that also make use of that phrase.
Given the serious problems of unclarity with premise (8a) and given the absence of argumentation in support of the dubious unstated premise (F), we already have good reason to view Argument #1 as a complete failure.
 
THE CORE ARGUMENT
Although premise (F) is the most important premise in the whole argument in relation to the ultimate conclusion that “God exists”, there is another very important part of the argument in relation to the explicitly stated conclusion (8a).  In viewing the argument diagram, which displays the reasoning supporting (8a), it is clear that the heart or core of that support is the two-premise argument supporting premise (6a).   The logical structure of the reasoning supporting (8a) is shown in this argument diagram (click on the image below for a clearer view of the diagram):
Diagram Argument 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here is what appears to be the core argument in the reasoning supporting (8a):

D. Anything that is outside the material universe is outside matter, space and time.

3a. There must be something outside the material universe.

THEREFORE:

6a. There is exactly ONE being outside the material universe and that being is outside matter, space and time.

This appears to be the core argument in support of (8a) because both premises of this argument are supported by arguments, and because (6a) is a key premise in the argument supporting (7a) and (8a).  So, this argument is firmly planted in the middle of the flow of logic moving from the initial premises to the stated conclusion (8a).
This core argument is clearly defective, because it is logically INVALID.  Premise (6a) does not follow from (D) and (3a).  We cannot infer that there is “exactly one” being outside the material universe from (D) and (3a).  At best, we can only infer that “at least one” such being exists, leaving open the possibility that hundreds or millions or trillions of such beings exist.
Both premises of this core argument are questionable, but Kreeft provides arguments in support of both premises, so we need to consider those sub-arguments before passing judgment on these two premises.  However, both (D) and (3a) make use of the phrase “outside the material universe” and the meaning of this phrase is UNCLEAR. Furthermore, Kreeft does not provide a definition or clarification of the meaning of this phrase, making it difficult to evaluate the truth of these premises.
The logic of Kreeft’s argument suggests that he is assuming (D) as a premise, in order to infer (6a) from (3a).  Premise (D) appears to be a conceptual claim, a partial analysis of the meaning of the phrase “outside the material universe”.
Since (D) implies that being “outside the material universe” is a sufficient condition for being “outside matter, space and time”,  this means that being “outside matter” is a necessary condition for being “outside the material universe” and that being “outside space” is a necessary condition for being “outside the material universe”, and that being “outside time” is a necessary condition for being “outside the material universe”.
Although Kreeft does not say so explicitly, this also suggests that these three necessary conditions are jointly sufficient.  In other words, if something meets all three of these necessary conditions, then it must be “outside the material universe”.
Based on this plausible interpretation, we can infer a definition of the key phrase in the core argument:
Something X is outside the material universe IF AND ONLY IF:

(a) X is outside matter,
AND
(b) X is outside space,
AND
(c) X is outside time.

Presumably by “outside matter” Kreeft means:  is not made of matter or energy.  Presumably by “outside space” Kreeft means:  does not have any spatial characteristics (does not have a size, a shape, or a location in space). Presumably by “outside time” Kreeft means:  does not have any temporal characteristics (does not have a beginning, an end, or a duration, and is unaffected by the passing of time).
Notice that, in theory, there are eight different combinations of these three conditions, and thus eight different types of beings (click on image below for a clearer view of the chart):
Eight Types of Beings
 
 
 
Ordinary things, such as people, animals, plants, and physical objects, are Type 1 beings.  God, on Kreeft’s view, is a Type 8 being.  But there are potentially six other types of beings besides Type 1 and Type 8 beings.  On Swinburne’s view of God, God is a Type 7 being, because although God is not made of matter or energy, and God does not have any spatial characteristics, God does exist inside time; God is affected by the passing of time, and some of God’s thoughts and actions occur prior in time to other of God’s thoughts and actions.
Another interesting case to consider is that of angels.  Angels appear to be outside matter (i.e. they are not made of matter or energy), but inside time, and perhaps inside space as well.  Angels began to exist at some point in time, according to Christian theology, and although many angels (perhaps all) will continue to exist forever, it is possible for God to annihilate  an angel, so it is possible for an angel to come to an end at a specific point in time; an angel can, at least in theory, have both a beginning at one point in time, and and end at a later point in time.  Angels also appear to have spatial locations.  They appear to particular people at particular times and particular places.  So, although angels are “outside matter”, they appear to be “inside time” and “inside space”; angels appear to be Type 2 beings.
Based on the definition of the phrase “outside the material universe”, it appears that angels are NOT “outside the material universe” because they are inside time, and inside space.  But angels are not made of matter or energy, so one might have been tempted to conclude that angels are “outside the material universe”.  It is odd and very surprising that something as supernatural as an angel would count as something that is inside the material universe.
Furthermore, if Swinburne is right that God is a Type 7 being, a being that exists inside time, then God too would be inside the material universe NOT “outside the material universe”.  Since I agree with Swinburne that God is a Type 7 being, I also reject the view that God is “outside the material universe”, given the definition of this phrase that Kreeft appears to be assuming.  In that case, proving the existence of a being that is “outside the material universe” would be irrelevant to showing that God exists, and thus (3a) and (6a) would be irrelevant to showing that God exists.
In any case, the core argument is INVALID, so it is an UNSOUND argument.
In the next post or two I will consider the sub-arguments that Kreeft gives to support the two premises of this core argument: (3a) and (D).  This will help to determine whether either or both or neither of these premises are true.  If one or both of these premises are false or dubious, that will provide another reason for rejecting the core argument supporting premise (8a).

bookmark_borderKreeft’s Case for God – Part 10: Analysis of Argument #1

ANALYSIS OF PHASE 1

In Part 9, I began to analyze and clarify the logic of Argument #1 (The Argument from Change) in Peter Kreeft’s case for God from Chapter 3 of Handbook of Christian Apologetics (hereafter: HCA).  My analysis focused on the first phase of the argument. Here is my understanding of the logical structure of the first phase of Argument #1:

1. IF there is nothing outside the material universe, THEN there is nothing that can cause the material universe to change.

A. IF there is nothing that can cause the material universe to change, THEN the material universe does not change.

THEREFORE:

B. IF there is nothing outside the material universe, THEN the material universe does not change.

2. But the material universe does change.

THEREFORE:

C. It is NOT the case that there is nothing outside the material universe.

THEREFORE:

3a. There must be something outside the material universe.

 
INITIAL ANALYSIS OF PHASE 2
Now it is time to focus on the second phase of the argument.  Here is my initial analysis of the structure of the second phase of Argument #1:

3a. There must be something outside the material universe.

4.  But the material universe is the sum total of all matter, space and time.

5.  Matter, space and time depend on each other.

THEREFORE:

6.  This being outside the material universe is outside matter, space and time.

THEREFORE:

7.  This being outside the material universe is not a changing thing.

THEREFORE:

8. This being outside the material universe is the unchanging Source of change.

 
THE FIRST INFERENCE OF PHASE 2
Premise (6) does not follow from premises (3a), (4), and (5).  However, premise (4) appears to imply a claim that is relevant to (6):

D. Anything that is outside the material universe is outside matter, space and time.

This unstated premise appears to be working with premise (3a) to support premise (6):

3a. There must be something outside the material universe.

D. Anything that is outside the material universe is outside matter, space and time.

THEREFORE:

6.  This being outside the material universe is outside matter, space and time.

I’m not sure of the role of premise (5).  Perhaps it works with premise (4) to support or imply (D).  In any case, it is the unstated premise (D) that is being used along with (3a) to support (6).
 
THE SECOND INFERENCE OF PHASE 2
The next inference is not logically valid; at least it is not clearly and obviously a valid deductive inference:

6.  This being outside the material universe is outside matter, space and time.

THEREFORE:

7.  This being outside the material universe is not a changing thing.

The expression “this being outside the universe” assumes or implies that there is just ONE such being, so this assumption should be made more clearly and explicitly.  In order to make the inference from (6) to (7) clearly and obviously valid, we need to add a missing premise to the inference:

6a. There is exactly one being outside the material universe and that being is outside matter, space and time.

E. Anything that is outside of time is not a changing thing.

THEREFORE:

7a.  There is exactly one being outside the material universe and that being is not a changing thing.

 
THE THIRD INFERENCE OF PHASE 2
The final inference in Argument #1 is clearly INVALID:

7a.  There is exactly one being outside the material universe and that being is not a changing thing.

THEREFORE:

8a. There is exactly one being outside the material universe and that being is the unchanging Source of change.

The most obvious and immediate problem is that the phrase “Source of change” appears nowhere previously in the argument, and it is unclear what this phrase means.  It might mean “the immediate cause of every change that occurs in the material universe” or it might mean “the ultimate cause of every change that occurs in the material universe” or it might mean “an ultimate cause of some change(s) in the material universe”  or it might mean “the immediate cause of every change TO the material universe” or it might mean “the ultimate cause of every change TO the material universe” or…
Because this phrase appears nowhere previously in the argument, the argument is clearly deductively invalid as it stands.  Further premises and/or inferences need to be added in order to turn this into a valid deductive argument.  I don’t see any easy way to fix this last inference.  I suspect that there is a significant gap of logic that needs filling here, but Kreeft has not left much in the way of clues to figure out what that logic would be.
I guess that since ANY change that occurs “inside” the material universe allegedly points to the existence of “something” that is “outside” the material universe, if there was just ONE being that was “outside” of the universe, then any and every change would ultimately trace back to that ONE being.  So, there is some sort of generalization or iteration of reasoning going on behind the scenes here, I suspect.    Given that ANY one single change “inside” the universe points (allegedly) to exactly ONE being “outside” the universe that is the ultimate cause of that change, it would follow that ALL changes could be traced back to that ONE being.
So, if all of the previous inferences were valid in Argument #1, then I suppose that one could validly infer (8a) as well, although NOT simply and directly from premise (7a).  The required reasoning would be more complicated than that.
 
THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF ARGUMENT #1
Here is an argument diagram showing the logical structure of Argument #1 (click on the image below for a clearer view of the diagram):
Diagram Argument 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
OK.  I have clarified and cleaned up the logical messiness of the first argument of Peter Kreeft’s case for God.  In the next post I will evaluate this argument.