bookmark_borderI Don’t Care – Part 6

Aquinas is often thought of as a rigourously logical and systematic thinker.  This is only half-true.  There is a good deal of vaguness, ambiguity, and illogical thinking in his book Summa Theologica, as far as I can see.
Here is a cautionary note from a philosopher who is an expert on Aquinas:
From the concept of God as ipsum esse subsistens, Thomas deduces certain other properties which must belong to God [i.e. in order to prove that “God”, in the ordinary sense of the word, exists].  The precise logical structure of the series of deductions undertaken by Thomas is very difficult to ascertain.  It is a very complicated structure for one thing; and although it resembles a series of proofs for theorems in a calculus, this comparison is probably not fair.  Thomas does nowhere systematically and exhaustively set out his equivalents of the definitions, axioms, and rules of inference of which he makes use.  The order in which he proves his “theorems” is no order of strict logical dependence. …Nor is it certain that he was absolutely clear in his own mind about the precise nature of his undertaking.  Thus, when we say that Thomas tries to deduce the other properties of God [i.e to prove that God exists] from the notion of ipsum esse subsistens, this must be taken as a kind of reconstruction of his intentions.  He nowhere says in so many words that this is what he is about to do.
(Knut Tranoy, “Thomas Aquinas”, in A Critical History of Western Philosophy;hereafter: CHOWP, p.111, emphasis added)
The first hint that Aquinas is something less than a rigorously logical thinker is his misuse of the word “God”.  Many people mistakenly think that Aquinas produced five arguments for the existence of God in the famous Five Ways passage from Summa Theologica (the Christian philosopher and apologist Peter Kreeft makes this mistake, for example).  That is probably because Aquinas claims to be proving the existence of God in that passage, but Aquinas is using the word “God” in an odd and non-standard way, and thus his arguments in the Five Ways are actually just a tiny piece of his long and complicated argument for the existence of God (in the ordinary sense of the word):
…it may appear that Aquinas is unjustified in describing the first efficient cause as God, at least if by “God” one has in mind a person possessing the characteristics Christian theologians and philosophers attribute to him (for example, omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, love, goodness, and so forth.).  Yet Aquinas does not attempt to show through the previous argument that the demonstrated cause has any of the qualities traditionally predicated of the divine essence.  He says:  “When the existence of a cause is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the cause in proof of the cause’s existence” (ST Ia 2.2 ad 2).  In other words, the term God—at least as it appears in ST Ia 2.2—refers only to that which produces the observed effect.  In the case of the second way, God is synonymous with the first efficient cause;  it does not denote anything of theological substance.  
(Shawn Floyd in “Aquinas: Philosophical Theology“, section 2b, from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Aquinas fails to grasp this basic principle of philosophical reasoning:
Before we can try to prove anything at all we must, of course, have some idea of the nature or properties of the being whose existence we want to prove. (Knut Tranoy, CHOWP, p.110)
Aquinas works ass-backwards by first proving the existence of “God” and THEN proving that “God” has various divine attributes.  So, in order to understand his argument for the existence of God, we must constantly replace the word “God” in his arguments, with the appropriate metaphysical concept for that particular phase of his argument.  For example, in the Five Ways passage, the conclusion of the 2nd Way is NOT that “God” exists but that “a first efficient cause” (an FEC) exists.
My attempt to begin to reconstruct the “very difficult to ascertain” structure of Aquinas’ argument for the existence of God starts in the middle of Aquinas’ argument, when he infers the existence of a being that has PERFECT KNOWLEDGE from the existence of a being that is IMMATERIAL:
Since therefore God is in the highest degree of immateriality, as stated above (Q. VII, A. 1), it follows that He occupies the hightest place in knowldege.  (Summa Theologica, Part I, Question 14, Article 1)
When I take a look at the section where Aquinas claims to have previously shown that “God is in the highest degree of immateriality” it turns out that the section is arguing for God being INFINITE (Q 7, A 1), not for God being IMMATERIAL.  There is mention of materiality in the argument, but it is difficult to take an argument for God being infinite and to try to revise the argument to be about God being “in the highest degree of immateriality”.
So, this is another bit of confusion and unclarity from Aquinas.  I’m NOT impressed by this sloppy presentation of a supposed “proof”, where the reader is expected to take a proof given for one thing and reformulate it so that it works as a proof for something else.  Also, the argument about infinity is a rambling one and its logic is difficult to discern.  If the argument for God’s infinity was more clear, I might be able to figure out how to reshape it into an argument for God being “in the highest degree of immateriality”.  But the argument is not very clear, and I’m not going to spend lots of time (at this point) trying to make sense out of it.
In any case, the argument for God’s infinity rests upon the concept of an IES (ipsum esse subsistens) being:
Since therefore the divine being is not a being received in anything, but He is His own subsistent being as was shown above (Q. III, A. 4), it is clear that God Himself is infinite and perfect.  (Summa Theologica, Part I, Question 7, Article 1)
Presumably since the derivation of God’s infinity is based on the concept of an IES being, the derivation of the conclusion that “God is in the highest degree of immateriality” is also based on the concept of an IES being.  In that case, we can at least summarize the flow of Aquinas’ logic:
(MC6) There exists an IES being.
(CC2) If there exists an IES being, then there exists an IES being that is in the highest degree of immateriality.
Therefore:
(MC8) There exists an IES being that is in the highest degree of immateriality.
(CC3) If there exists an IES being that is in the highest degree of immateriality, then there exists an IES being that is in the highest degree of immateriality and that has perfect knowledge.
Therefore:
(MC9) There exists an IES being that is in the highest degree of immateriality and that has perfect knowledge.
Now we can work forward from the five metaphysical claims (that Aquinas argues for in the Five Ways passage) to get to the metaphysical claim of the existence of an IES being, (MC6), and thus complete the line of reasoning from the Five Ways to the existence of an IES being that has perfect knowledge.
The key passage about the existence of an IES being appears to be Question 3 , Article 4 (which Aquinas references in the above quotation).  In that passage, there are three different arguments to establish the existence of an IES being, which can be summarized in terms of three conditional claims:
(CC4) If there exists an FEC (first efficient cause) being, then there exists and FEC being that is also an IES being.
(CC5) If there exists an AP (actus purus, i.e. purely actual) being, then there exists an AP being that is also an IES being.
(CC6) If there exists a First being that is its own essence, then there exists a being that is its own essence and that is both a First Being and an IES being. 
The First Line of Reasoning Supporting (MC6)
The existence of an FEC being was argued for in the Five Ways passage, so that particular line of reasoning has been traced back to its starting point: the 2nd Way, which is an argument for this metaphysical claim.  We can combine that metaphysical claim with one of the above conditional claims to form a modus ponens:
(MC2)  There exists an FEC being.
(CC4) If there exists an FEC (first efficient cause) being, then there exists an FEC being that is also an IES being.
Therefore:
(MC10) There exists an FEC being that is also an IES being.
Therefore:
(MC6) There exists an IES being.
Here is a simple diagram showing the flow of this first line of reasoning:
FEC–>FEC & IES–>IES
 
The Second Line of Reasoning Supporting (MC6)
The second argument for the existence of an IES being is based on the following key metaphysical claim:
(MC7) There exists an AP being.
This metaphysical claim is argued for in Question 3:
Secondly, beause the first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potency. …Now it has already been proved that God is the First Being.  It is therefore impossible that in God there should be anything in potency.  (Summa Theologica, Question 3, Article 1, in the second argument)
The reasoning can again be put into the form of a modus ponens:
(MC11) There exists a First Being.
(CC7) If there exists a First Being, then there exists a First Being that is also an AP being.
Therefore:
(MC12) There exists a First Being that is also an AP being.
Therefore:
(MC7) There exists an AP being.
However, because Aquinas is somewhat careless in his reasoning, it is unclear what he means by a “First Being”.  This is a technical term, and Aquinas introduces it without providing a definition, and without providing any explanation or clarification of what this term means.
Since the passage I quoted that refers to “the First Being” occurs immediately after the famous Five Ways passage, this new technical term presumably refers to one of the following “first” beings discussed in the Five Ways passage:
(MC1) There exists a UFC being.  
(“a UFC being” = a being that is an unchanged first changer – often misleadingly translated “unmoved first mover” )
(MC2) There exists an FEC being.  
(“an FEC being” =  a being that is a first efficient cause)
(MC3) There exists an FN being.
(“an FN being” = a being that is a first necessary being, a being that is necessary but does not get its necessity from another being)
The 4th and 5th Ways do not speak of a being that is “first”, and unlike the other three Ways, they do not make use of the rejection of an infinite regress (to establish the existence of a being as the “first” in a chain of dependency), so the COP (cause of all perfections) being, and the IDN (intelligent designer of nature) being, do NOT seem to be good candiates for the referent of the expression “the First Being”.
My best guess is that when Aquinas speaks of “the First Being” in Question 3, he is referring back to the being that he tries to prove exists in his 2nd Way:  an FEC being.  The expression “the First Being” suggests the idea of “the First thing that exists”, and it is the 2nd Way that focuses in on the cause of the existence of beings in general.  The 1st Way is focused on the cause of changes, and the 3rd Way is focused on the cause of necessary beings, which is a special category of beings.  So, only the 2nd Way relates to the cause of the existence of beings in general.  I’m not certain of this interpretation of “the First Being”, but it seems to be the best of the three main alternatives.
Assuming my interpretation of “First Being” is correct, we can trace this line of reasoning back to the 2nd Way:
(MC2) There exists an FEC being.  
(CC8) If there exists an FEC being, then there exists an FEC being that is also an AP being.
Therefore:
(MC13) There exists an FEC being that is also an AP being.
Therefore:
(MC7) There exists an AP being.
(CC5) If there exists an AP (actus purus, i.e. purely actual) being, then there exists an AP being that is also an IES being.
Therefore:
(MC14) There exists an AP being that is also an IES being.
Therefore:
(MC6) There exists an IES being.
Here is a simple diagram showing the flow of this second line of reasoning:
FEC–>FEC & AP–>AP–>AP & IES–>IES
 
The Third Line of Reasoning Supporting (MC6)
The third line of reasoning involves another reference to the “First Being”:
(CC6) If there exists a First being that is its own essence, then there exists a being that is its own essence and that is both a First Being and an IES being. 
If we interpret the expression “First Being” as a reference to an FEC being, then this conditional claim (CC6) can be stated more clearly:
(CC9) If there exists an FEC being that is its own essence, then there exists a being that is its own essence and that is both an FEC being and an IES being. 
We have part of what is needed to show the truth of the antecedent of this conditional claim:
(MC2) There exists an FEC being.  
But it needs to be shown that such a being “is its own essence” in order for us to be able to affirm the truth of the antecedent of (CC9).  Aquinas argues for the existence of a being that “is its own essence” in Question 3, Article 3: Whether God Is the Same As His Essence or Nature?  The argument in that section is based on another metaphysical concept:
Since God then is not composed of matter and form, He must be His own Godhead, His own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him.  (Summa Theologica, Part I, Question 3, Article 3)
This suggests the following conditional claim:
(CC10) If there exists a being that is not composed of matter and form, then there exists a being that is its own essence.
Since Aquinas needs to prove the existence of a being that is both an FEC being and that is its own essence, he needs to prove the following modified version of the above conditional claim:
(CC11) If there exists an FEC being that is not composed of matter and form, then there exists an FEC being that is its own essence.
Aquinas argues that God is “not composed of matter and form” in Question 3, Article 2: Whether God is Composed of Matter and Form?  He gives three different arguments to support this claim, and the third argument is based on the concept of an FEC being:
Now God is the first agent, since He is the first effecient cause as we have shown (Q. II, A. 3).  He is therefore of His essence a form, and not composed of matter and form.  (Summa Theologica, Part I, Question 3, Article 2).
So we can now trace this line of reasoning back to the 2nd Way, because Aquinas has argued for this conditional claim:
(CC12) If there exists an FEC being, then there exists an FEC being that is not composed of matter and form.
Add to this the metaphysical claim from the 2nd Way for a modus ponens:
(MC2) There exists an FEC being.
Therefore:
(MC15) There exists an FEC being that is not composed of matter and form.
(CC11) If there exists an FEC being that is not composed of matter and form, then there exists an FEC being that is its own essence.
Therefore:
(MC16) There exists an FEC being that is its own essence.
(CC9) If there exists an FEC being that is its own essence, then there exists a being that is its own essence and that is both an FEC being and an IES being. 
Therefore:
(MC17) There exists a being that is its own essence and that is both an FEC being and an IES being. 
Therefore:
(MC6) There exists an IES being.
Here is a simple diagram showing the flow of this third line of reasoning:
FEC–> FEC & not composed of matter and form–>FEC & is its own essence–>is its own essence & FEC & IES–>IES
=======================
If we ignore the conditional claims and focus on just the metaphysical claims in the above arguments, we can depict the flow of Aquinas’ reasoning from the conclusion of the 2nd Way (MC2), to the conclusion that there is an IES being with PERFECT KNOWLEDGE (MC9).  Click on the image below for a clearer view of the diagram:
Flow of Reasoning from MC2 to MC9
 
 
 

bookmark_borderI Don’t Care – Part 3

According to the Christian philosopher Peter Kreeft, and many others, Aquinas gives five different arguments for the existence of God.  In the Handbook of Christian Apologetics (IVP, 1994; hereafter: HCA) by Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli, there is a chapter that lays out twenty different arguments for the existence of God, and the first five arguments are versions of Aquinas’ Five Ways:
A word about the organization of the arguments.  We have organized them into two basic groups: those which take their data from without–cosmological arguments–and those that take it from within–psychological arguments.  The group of cosmological arguments begins with our versions of Aquinas’ famous “five ways.” (HCA, p.49)
Kreeft is Catholic, so it is not surprising that he puts these arguments by Aquinas at the front of his list of arguments.  On pages 50 through 58 of HCA, Kreeft and Tacelli lay out five different arguments for the existence God that they take to be versions of five different arguments for the existence of God presented by Aquinas in Summa Theologica (Part I, Question 2, Article 3: Whether God Exists?).
I believe, however, that Kreeft and Tacelli are WRONG on this point, and that Aquinas has only ONE argument for the existence of God, or possibly TWO arguments.  I will need to study the details of Aquinas’ case for God a bit further in order to make a final determination on whether he has ONE argument or TWO arguments for God.  (Note: This alternative way of understanding the Five Ways passage is presented by Knut Tranoy in A Critical History of Western Philosophy; see pages 110-112).
Kreeft and Tacelli, I suspect, were deceived by the misleading title of the famous Five Ways passage in Summa Theologica:  “Whether God Exists?”.   Since Aquinas gives five different arguments in that passage, this makes it seem as though he was giving five different arguments for the existence of God.  But this is a gross distortion and a serious misunderstanding of the Five Ways passage.  There are exactly ZERO arguments for the existence of God in the Five Ways passage.
The problem is that Aquinas does not define what he means by “God”, and that what he apparently means by “God” is NOT what the word “God” means in the English language, especially in relation to the Christian religion and Christian theology.  So, in the Five Ways passage, Aquinas does NOT argue for the existence of “God” in the ordinary sense of the word, as used by Christian believers and Christian philosophers and apologists.
The word “God” is a proper noun, the name of a single being.  The meaning of this name is based on a definite description, a list of properties or characteristics that (allegedly) belong to one, and only one, person.  A bare-bones definite description of this person would include the following properties (at least in relation to the use of the word “God” by Christian believers, and especially Christian philosophers and apologists):

  • the creator of the universe
  • an eternally bodiless person
  • an eternally omnipotent person
  • an eternally omniscient person
  • an eternally perfectly morally good person

Although the ordinary use of the word “God” probably does not entail the possession of each and every one of these properties by the being in question (because the ordinary use of famous names typically is criterial  and thus allows some wiggle room, allowing the name to be properly applied so long as the being in question possesses MOST of the properties in the definite description and no other being possesses MOST of the properties), it is clearer, logically cleaner, and more theologically conservative to treat the list of properties in this definite description as necessary conditions for the proper application of the name “God” to a particular being, and to take them jointly as a sufficient condition for the proper application of the name “God” to a particular being.
What Aquinas actually argues for in the Five Ways is the following five metaphysical claims:
(MC1) There exists an AP being.  
(“an AP being” = a being that is actus purus, i.e. pure act)
(MC2) There exists an FEC being.  
(“an FEC being” =  a being that is a first efficient cause)
(MC3) There exists an IES being.
(“an IES being” = a being that is ipsum esse subsistens, i.e. its own self-subisting existence)
(MC4) There exists a COP being.
(“a COP being” = a being that is the cause of all perfections)
(MC5)  There exists an IDN being.
(“a IDN being” = a being that is the intelligent designer of nature)
Aquinas goes on in OTHER passages of Summa Theologica to use (MC3) as the basis for an argument for the existence of God (in the ordinary sense of the word that I have outlined above), and one could argue that he has a second argument for the existence of God that is based on (MC1).  Each argument can be summarized as a modus ponens that contains a metaphysical claim as the first premise and a conditional claim that links the metaphysical claim to the existence of God:
THE IES ARGUMENT
(MC3) There exists an IES being.
(CC1) IF there exists an IES being, THEN God exists.
Therefore:
(G) God exists.
 
THE AP ARGUMENT
 (MC1) There exists an AP being.
(CC2) IF there exists an AP being, THEN God exists.
Therefore:
(G) God exists.
It might be the case that Aquinas intended for the two key metaphysical claims to function together in a single argument for God (or possibly although this was not his intention, this might be an improved way to make use of Aquinas’ reasoning about God to formulate an argument for the existence of God):
THE COMBINED IES & AP ARGUMENT
(MC6)  There exists a being that is both an IES being and an AP being.
(CC3) IF there exists a being that is both an IES being and an AP being, THEN God exists.
Therefore:
(G) God exists.
Whether Aquinas gives ONE argument or TWO arguments for the existence of God, it is clear that the Five Ways passage contains arguments for only five metaphysical claims, and contains ZERO arguments for the conditional claims in the above modus ponens arguments for the existence of God.  Crudely speaking, the Five Ways passage is concerned with only HALF of Aquinas’ argument for the existence of God: the metaphysical claim but not the conditional claim.
But, more accurately, MOST of Aquinas’ reasoning about the existence of God is found in later sections of Summa Theologica that contain a lengthy and complex chain of reasoning consisting of four or five phases (see  post 2 of the I Don’t Care series for a chart that lays out the phases) in order to support the conditional claim(s) in the above argument(s).  So MOST of Aquinas’ argument for the existence of God is found OUTSIDE of the Five Ways passage.
Each of the conditional claims in the above modus ponens arguments is a summary of a lengthy and complex line of reasoning by Aquinas and can be broken down further into a series of conditional claims of the following form:
(P1) If there exists a being with property W, then there exists a being with properties W & X.
(P2) If there exists a being with properties W & X, then there exists a being with properties W & X & Y.
(P3) If there exists a being with properties W & X & Y, then there exists a being with properties W & X & Y & Z.
Therefore:
(P4) If there exists a being with property W, then there exists a being with properties W & X & Y & Z.
(P5) If there exists a being with properties W & X & Y & Z, then God exists.
Therefore:
(CC) If there exists a being with property W, then God exists.
Aquinas provides reasoning in support each of the conditional claims in this more complex argument, but he does so OUTSIDE of the Five Ways passage.  Thus, MOST of the reasoning that Aquinas provides in support of the existence of God is OUTSIDE of the Five Ways passage.
This means that Kreeft and Tacelli (and many others as well) have completely misunderstood Aquinas’ argument(s) for the existence of God and have only touched upon a small portion of the actual reasoning that Aquinas puts forward for the existence of God in Summa Theologica.
Given this point of view, let me re-state and clarify the meaning of the title of this series of posts:
I DON’T CARE about the first five arguments in Chapter 3 of HCA by Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli, because those arguments are gross distortions and serious misunderstandings of the actual argument(s) for the existence of God given by Aquinas in Summa Theologica.
HOWEVER, I am very much interested in the actual argument(s) that Aquinas gives for the existence of God in Summa Theologica, and I plan to study his reasoning on this issue more closely and then present it in greater detail in future installments of this series.

bookmark_borderI Don’t Care – Part 2

OK. Maybe I care just a little bit.
I summarized my complaint against Aquinas’ Five Ways this way (in response to a comment from Jeff Lowder):
I’m just pointing out that (a) NONE of the Five Ways is an argument for the existence of God as it stands (in the section called “Whether God Exists?”), and (b) in order to make use of any of the Five Ways as an argument for the existence of God, there is a serious amount of intellectual effort required to fill the logical gap that is located in the space where Aquinas dropped this philosophical turd: “to which everyone gives the name of God.”
I also re-iterated a similar complaint against William Craig:
This seems to be a bit of a habit for William Craig. Craig is literally a half-ass thinker. His case for the resurrection is half-assed because he completely ignores the question of whether Jesus died on the cross, which is HALF of his burden of proof. In most of the presentations of the Kalam cosmological argument that I have read, Craig makes only brief and cursory attempts to argue that the cause of the beginning of the universe is God. So, on two of the most central issues of Christian apologetics, Craig leaves half the argument largely untouched.
However, the writings of Aquinas are extensive, and he has a lot to say about God, so as Peter Kreeft points out, we cannot properly evaluate Aquinas’ case for God based just on the presentation of the Five Ways in Summa Theologica (Part I, Question 2, Article 3:”Whether God Exists?”):
These five are not the proofs themselves but ways, i.e. indications or summaries of proofs. The proofs themselves are elsewhere worked out in much greater detail; e.g. in the Summa contra Gentiles the first way takes thirty-one paragraphs (Bk 1 Chap. 13); here it takes only one. (Summa of the Summa, p.61)
Although I’m sticking to my guns on the two points of criticism against Aquinas above,  I have to apologize to Aquinas (and his fans) for the implication that he was a “half-ass thinker” (given my unkind comparison of Aquinas with the half-ass philosophers William Craig and J.P. Moreleand).  A wider look at the works of Aquinas reveals that he actually DOES make an argument for the existence of God, just not in the section of Summa Theologica called “Whether God Exists?”.  I will outline Aquinas’ argument for God a bit later in this post.
I took a look at the passage in the Summa contra Gentiles that Kreeft pointed to as presenting the First Way in greater depth and detail.  That passage does provide a more detailed expostion of the argument for the existence of an unmoved mover, but Aquinas makes NO ATTEMPT (in that section of Summa contra Gentiles) to argue that an unmoved mover has ANY of the major divine attributes (i.e. personhood, creator of the universe, eternally omnipotent, eternally omniscient, eternally perfectly good). Aquinas just goes into greater detail and depth to argue that there exists an unmoved mover.  So, in the section of Summa contra Gentiles that Kreeft points us to, Aquinas still does NOT present an argument for the existence of God.
Kreeft is correct that the Five Ways passage is only a summary of reasoning that Aquinas presents in greater detail and depth elsewhere.  However, Kreeft fails to point out a very basic and important point about the content of the Five Ways:  they represent only the FIRST PHASE of an argument that consists of at least FIVE PHASES.  So, the Five Ways are summaries of more extensive reasoning, but they are NOT summaries of Aquinas’ argument for the existence of God; they are summaries of the FIRST PHASE of his multi-phased argument! (I suspect that Kreeft is not aware of Aquinas’ actual argument for the existence of God, otherwise he would have mentioned this very important point).
The fact that it takes Aquinas four more phases of argumentation to finally get to the conclusion that God exists shows that my objection was absolutely spot on when I complained that “there is a serious amount of intellectual effort required to fill the logical gap that is located in the space where Aquinas dropped this philosophical turd: ‘to which everyone gives the name of God.’ ”  Aquinas does make a serious attempt to fill in that HUGE logical gap; you just have to search through his various writings to find this intellectual effort.
I turned to A Critical History of Western Philosophy (edited by D.J. O’Connor; hereafter: CHOWP) in hopes of getting a better perspective on Aquinas’ thinking about God, and was delighted to find an excellent article on Aquinas by Knut Tranoy.  The article expresses an objection similar to mine, perhaps a bit more clearly than my own attempt to express it:
Granted that each argument is in order as it stands, we then have five different series, each terminating in a “first” which is, respectively, a prime mover, a first efficient cause, a necessary being, a supreme perfection, and a designer or governor of the universe.  In order to amount to a proof of the existence of God, it must then also be shown that (1) the five series converge in one and the same point (the prime mover = first efficient cause, etc.), and (2) that the point of convergence has all the properties which the God of Christianity is said to have.  And this Thomas does not show.  (CHOWP, p.110)
The criticism in the last sentence has an unstated qualification: Thomas does not show these two key points in the passage on the Five Ways in Summa Theologica.  Tranoy goes on to describe how Aquinas does address at least point (2) in other passages and other books.
Tranoy makes a basic point of logic that Aquinas was apparently unclear on:
To prove or to produce evidence that a certain being x, exists, is, one might say, to prove that a certain set of compossible properties is actualized.  That is, we cannot prove or know that x exists without at the same time knowing something about the nature or essence of x.
To prove the existence of God is, then, to show that the properties ascribed to the Christian God in the Bible are actualized in one and only one being.  At least our proof must show that the property or set of properties is actualized from which all the other required properties necessarily follow.  (CHOWP, p.110)
Aquinas should have started out with a definition or analysis of the word “God” that spells out what this word means in relation to the Christian faith (or perhaps in relation to the big three western theistic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam).  The definition or analysis would contain the main divine attributes, such as:  bodiless person, creator of the universe, eternally omnipotent, eternally omniscient, eternally perfectly good.  After proving the existence of an unmoved mover and a first efficient cause, etc.  He should have immediately argued that these beings were a single being, and then he should have argued that this single being has all (or perhaps most) of the main divine attributes that constitute the definition/analysis of the word “God” from a Christian point of view. Aquinas did not proceed this way.
However, based on Tranoy’s explication of Aquinas’ thinking about God, it appears that one can piece together from various writings by Aquinas an argument for the existence of God that involves at least FIVE PHASES.  Tranoy has a little diagram that lays out the logic at a high level (see CHOWP, p.112), and I have added some details and distinctions to his diagram to produce the following chart (click on the image for a clearer view of the chart):
Aquinas Argument for God
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The arguments that constitute the Five Ways are summaries of the reasoning in support of Phase 1 (particularly Way 3, which argues for a “necessary being” i.e. a being that is ipsum esse subsistens).  Thus, Aquinas’ argument for the existence of God is like an iceberg, and the Five Ways are merely the visible tip of that iceberg.  MOST of the argument is invisible in the section of the Summa Theologica that is called “Whether God Exists?”.  MOST of the argument is simply missing from the presentation of the Five Ways in that passage.
The overall logic is that Aquinas first establishes the existence of a being with various “metaphysical” properties, and then on the basis of that conclusion he argues for the existence of a being who has various “religious” properties, the divine attributes that constitute the meaning of the word “God” from a Christian or religious point of view (I think this line of reasoning could also be used by Jewish or Muslim apologists to defend their belief in the existence of God).  The effort to establish the existence of a being with various metaphysical properties involves three phases:
1. Show the existence of beings that each have a core metaphysical property.
2. Show that these beings with a core metaphysical property are the same being.
3. Show the existence of a being with a variety of derived metaphysical properties (logically derived from the core metaphysical properties).
The next two phases are concerned with establishing the existence of a being with a variety of religious properties:
4. Show the existence of a being with a core religious property (i.e. perfect knowledge).
5. Show the existence of a being with various derived religious properties (logically derived from the core religious property and from previously established metaphysical properties).
Once Phase 5 is completed, it is a short step of logic to the ultimate conclusion: God exists.
Recall that in Summa contra Gentiles, Aquinas writes several pages of reasoning just to arrive at the Phase 1 conclusion that there exists an unmoved mover.  I don’t know if Aquinas goes into the same degree of detail and depth in his reasoning supporting the other phases of his argument, but I would not be surprised if he did.  I’m not certain that Aquinas argues for the claim of Phase 2 (that the IES being and the AP being are the same being), but I suspect that he does.  According to Tranoy, Aquinas does provide reasoning is support of the other Phases of the argument.
I strongly suspect that there are logical errors and dubious assumptions sprinkled throughout the long and complex development of this line of reasoning by Aquinas, and that I will find multiple reasons to reject his “proof” of the existence of God, but at least Aquinas made the attempt, at least he realized, at some level, that there was a huge logical gap in the argument presented in the passage laying out the Five Ways.  
Aquinas, unlike Craig and Moreland, recognized that there was a large logical gap between establishing the existence of a being with a metaphysical property (like being an “unmoved mover” or a “first efficient cause”) on the one hand, and the existence of God on the other.