bookmark_borderAtheism, Morality, and Divine Nature Theories vs. Ideal Observer Theories

This another item I found while organizing material on my hard drive. I think I am the author, but I am not certain of that.

What is the advantage of divine nature theories over ideal observer theories?  Consider, for example, a divine nature theory of moral value.  On such a view, God’s nature, not God, is the source of moral value.  But what is the distinction between God and His nature?  Presumably, God’s nature is simply the collection of God’s properties or attributes (e.g., the property of omniscience, the property of omnipotence, etc.).  But if that is the case, then why do we need God in order for moral value to supervene on one or more of such properties?  Or to put the point differently, why must those properties be instantiated in the person of God in order for the supervenience relationship to hold?   And if such properties do not need to be instantiated in the person of God, then what is the advantage of the divine nature theory over, say, an ideal observer theory?