bookmark_borderWhat is Faith? – Part 7

I’m going to take a detour and temporarily set Mr. Swinburne’s characterization of the Thomist view of faith aside.  But I will continue to examine the Thomist view of faith, specifically as presented by Dr. Norman Geisler.
As Jeff Lowder has recently shown, Dr. Geisler’s case for Christianity is a failure.  IMHO Jeff won that match with a K.O. of Geisler in the very first round:
 Let’s suppose, but only for the sake of argument, that the following evidence favors theism over atheism, i.e., is more probable on the assumption that theism is true than on the assumption that atheism is true: the beginning of the universe, the design of the universe, the design of life, and the existence of the moral law. Even so, it still doesn’t follow that, all things considered, God’s existence is more likely than not. For example, it may be the case—and I think is the case—that there is other evidence which favors atheism over theism. But, if true, that entails that G&T’s [Geisler and Turek] case violates the Total Evidence Requirement and so G&T’s case accordingly fails to show that Christianity is probably true. 
Geisler’s case for Christianity was decimated by Jeff in just one paragraph-BOOM; that is the awesome power of logic.
Although Dr. Geisler’s case for Christianity fails, I appreciate his thinking about the resurrection of Jesus, especially what I have called Geisler’s Principle:
Before we can show that Jesus rose from the dead, we need to show that He really did die.        
(When Skeptics Ask, by Norman Geisler and Ron Brooks, p.120)
Based on this principle, one can also decimate William Craig’s case for the resurrection in just one paragraph, since Dr. Craig has never made a serious attempt to show that Jesus really did die on the cross.  So, despite the shortcomings of his Christian apologetics,  Dr. Geisler has some worthwhile things to say.   I am now going to turn to an article by Geisler on “Faith and Reason”, in order to become more familiar with the details of the Thomist view of faith.
Geisler is clearly a fan of Aquinas, even more than Swinburne is a fan.  In the Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics (1999; hereafter: BECA), Geisler has written a fairly long and detailed article on “Faith and Reason”, and the entire article is basically an exposition of the views of Aquinas about faith and the relationship between faith and reason.  Here is how Geisler characterizes the place of Aquinas in the history of thinking about faith and reason:
 Augustine made the first serious attempt to relate the two [faith and reason], but the most comprehensive treatment came at the end of the medieval period when Christian intellectualism flowered in the work of Thomas Aquinas.            (BECA, p. 239)
I see no criticisms, objections, or reservations expressed by Geisler about the views of Aquinas concerning the relationship of faith and reason, and given that Geisler has devoted the entire article on “Faith and Reason” to laying out the views of Aquinas, it seems clear that Geisler agrees with the view of faith and reason put forward by Aquinas, or at least he sees the view of Aquinas as the best of available comprehensive treatments of this topic.
There are nine bolded subheadings in Geisler’s article on “Faith and Reason”:
1. Relation of Faith to Reason
2. Three Uses of Reason
3. Divine Authority
4. Reason in Support of Faith
5. Distinguishing Faith and Reason
6. Perfected by Love, Produced by Grace
7. The Limitations of Reason
8. Things Above Reason
9. Summary
I might skip over some of these sections, but several look interesting and significant.  The first section looks significant, so I’ll start there.
 
1. Relation of Faith to Reason
There is just one subheading within this section: “Reason Cannot Produce Faith.”  If that is the Thomist view, then the idea of a “purely rational faith” that I described in the previous post, would seem NOT to fit with the Thomist view of ‘faith in God’.  The comments in this section make faith seem unavoidably  irrational:
Faith is consent without inquiry in that faith’s assent is not caused by investigation.  Rather, it is produced by God.  Commenting on Ephesians 2:8-9, Aquinas contended that “free will is inadequate for the act of faith since the contents of faith are above reason. …That a man should believe, therefore, cannot occur from himself unless God gives it” (Aquinas, Ephesians, 96; unless noted, all citations in this article are from works by Thomas Aquinas). Faith is a gift of God, and no one can believe without it. (BECA, p.239)
Geisler knows more about Aquinas than I do, so I’m inclined to accept his interpretation of Aquinas, at least provisionally.  However, the quote of Aquinas here does not say anything about “inquiry” or “investigation”, so Geisler is reading something between the lines here that is less than obvious, at least to me.
I’m not sure what Aquinas means by the statement that “free will is inadequate for the act of faith since the contents of faith are above reason.”  But my guess would be that he means that we cannot simply choose to believe in the doctrines of Christianity that are beyond discovery by human reason, because such doctrines must FIRST be revealed by God to human beings (at some point in history).  If a particular true idea is undiscoverable by means of human “inquiry” or “investigation”, then that implies that human beings will never discover that true idea, at least not on their own.  The trinity is a doctrine that Aquinas believes to be true, and to be beyond the power of human beings to discover by means of reason (or Geisler would say: by means of human “inquiry” or “investigation”).
On the other hand, there is a sense in which the doctrine of the trinity IS discovered by means of human inquiry and investigation, even if Aquinas’ views about the necessity of divine revelation are correct.  If I am to believe that the doctrine of the trinity is true on the basis of the fact that the Bible teaches the doctrine of the trinity, I have to first determine whether the Bible is worthy of my trust concerning theological claims, and to determine that question, I need to determine whether there is a God and whether the Bible was inspired by God, and whether the Bible’s original contents have been preserved from corruption over the centuries.  All three of these issues require human inquiry and investigation; these issues require the use of human REASON.  Aquinas pointed to miracles as evidence that the Bible is the inspired Word of God.  But if we need evidence to determine whether the Bible is inspired by God, then we need REASON to determine whether the Bible is the inspired Word of God.
Also, it clearly will not do to appeal to the authority of the Bible in order to determine whether the Bible is the inspired Word of God.  For if the Bible is NOT inspired by God, then it has no significant authority concerning theological questions (such as “Did God inspire the Bible?”).  Appealing to the divine authority of the Bible in order to support the divine authority of the Bible is reasoning in a circle, so such an appeal has no force.
If Aquinas has in mind examples like the doctrine of the trinity being beyond the power of human investigation and inquiry, then it still seems to me that ‘faith in God’ can be purely rational and that ‘faith in God’ can be produced by REASON (on Aquinas’s view).  Belief in the trinity is based on acceptance of the authority of the Bible rather than based on a philosophical argument/proof about the details of this doctrine.  But there is still reasoning required to arrive at the conclusion that the Bible is a good and trustworthy source of theological information.
We must first determine that God exists (or at least, following Swinburne, that it is probable that God exists).  Then we must determine that the Bible was inspired by God (or at least, that it is probable that the Bible was inspired by God).  Then we must determine that the text of the Bible has been well-preserved over the centuries that have passed since it was first written down (or at least, that it is probable that the text of the Bible has been well-preserved).  All of this seems in keeping with the views of Aquinas, and all of this is a matter of REASON, of human inquiry and investigation into the existence of God, and into the inspiration of the Bible.
So, even if the trinity is a true doctrine and that no human being could ever discover the truth of the doctrine of the trinity by means of REASON without the help of divine revelation, it would still be the case that one’s acceptance of divine revelation (for example accepting the doctrine of the trinity on the basis of the authority of the Bible) would be based upon REASON, a human investigation or inquiry into questions about the existence of God and the alleged inspiration of the Bible.

bookmark_borderWhat is Faith? – Part 3

I said that I was not going to walk slowly through the rest of Chapter 4 of Faith and Reason (FAR), by Richard Swinburne.  But there is a lot going on in the next few paragraphs of Chapter 4, and I find myself wanting to make several comments on them.  So, contrary to my previous plans,  I’m going to continue to walk slowly through at least the next few paragraphs.
Before we get to Swinburne’s characterization of the Thomist view of faith,  I have a couple more comments.  Swinburne focuses on the ideas of “belief that” and “trust in a person” as key aspects of different views of faith.  The Thomist view focuses on “belief that”, while the Lutheran view focuses on “trust in a person”.  I would like to point out two fairly obvious logical connections between these ideas, before we see what Swinburne has to say about how they are related to the concept of faith:
1.  One kind of “trust in a person” leads quite naturally to the formation of beliefs.
If I trust a person for advice or information, then when that person gives me advice, or gives me information, I will be inclined to form beliefs in accordance with that advice or information.  If my doctor tells me “The best way to ensure a full recovery from your illness is to do X”, and if I trust my doctor for medical advice, then I will be inclined to form the belief that “The best way to ensure a full recovery from my illness is to do X.”  If my chemistry professor tells me that “Hydrogen has an atomic weight of 1.00794 u, and hydrogen is the lightest element in the periodic table.”, and if I trust my professor to know about such things in the field of chemistry, then I will be inclined to form the belief that  “Hydrogen has an atomic weight of 1.00794 u, and hydrogen is the lightest element in the periodic table.” (Thanks to Wikipedia for this example).
2. Trust in a person normally (always?) involves beliefs about that person.
If I trust a person to take good care of my daughter while I am on a trip out of town, I do so on the basis of beliefs about the trustworthiness of that person.  I believe that this person cares about the well-being of my daughter.  I believe that this person is capable of taking good care of my daughter.  I believe that this person has a strong commitment to take good care of my daughter while I’m away, and I believe that this person is a responsible person who will do their best to fulfill this commitment.  My trusting this person is grounded in various beliefs that I have about the character and abilities of this person.
According to Swinburne, the Thomist view of faith is closely related to what…
…is by far the most widespread and natural view of the nature of religious faith.  This is the view that, with one addition and two qualifications, to have faith in God is simply to have a belief-that God exists. (FAR, p.138)
So we now have a proposed simple definition of faith:
Definition 1
Person P has faith in God IF AND ONLY IF  P believes that God exists.
One interesting and problematic implication of this definition is that the devil has ‘faith in God’.  According to the Christian scriptures, the devil believes that God exists.  But clearly, the devil does NOT trust in God, and the devil does NOT love God, and the devil has no desire to obey God.  The devil is at war with God, but to be at war with God requires that the devil believe that God exists.  If the devil has ‘faith in God’, then it would seem that ‘faith in God’ is NOT the kind of faith that the Christian religion commends.  Or, at least, the particular sort of ‘faith in God’ that the devil has falls short of the kind of ‘faith in God’ that is commended by Christianity.
Here is the “one addition” that Aquinas makes to the simple definition of ‘faith in God’ above:
…to have faith in God, you have to believe not merely that there is a God, but certain other propositions as well…. More central to faith are the other propositions about what God is like and what acts He has done, and you have to believe these latter propositions on the ground that God has revealed them. (FAR, p.138)
In case you didn’t notice, there are at least TWO additional elements that have been added to the initial simple definition.  First, there is the additional element that there are beliefs beyond just the existence of God that are central to faith, beliefs about “what God is like and what acts He has done”.  Second, these beliefs must be accepted “on the ground that God has revealed them.”:
Definition 2
Person P has faith in God
IF AND ONLY IF
(a) P believes that God exists,  AND
(b) P believes that God has various properties (divine attributes),  AND
(c) P believes that God has performed various actions,  AND
(d) any beliefs that P has about God’s properties or actions are accepted on the ground that God has revealed those beliefs.
This is clearly a bit more complicated than the initial simple definition of ‘faith in God’.  However, even with the additional requirements, it still looks to me like the devil would have ‘faith in God’ on this definition.
The only potential reason for denying that the devil meets these conditions would be doubt about whether the devil’s beliefs about the properties and actions of God are “accepted on the ground that God has revealed those beliefs.”
Aquinas might argue that the devil knows about God’s properties and actions in a way that is more direct than the way that humans know, or become aware of, God’s properties and actions.  The devil, Aquinas might say, doesn’t need God’s help to learn about God’s properties and actions; the devil can directly perceive God in a way that humans cannot.  Humans need God to reveal his properties and actions to them; they cannot simply or directly perceive God, God’s properties, or God’s actions, at least not without God’s assistance.
There might be an ambiguity in condition (d).  It is not immediately clear to me whether (d) could be satisfied if God did NOT exist.  In other words, it is not clear to me whether (d) states a subjective or an objective requirement.   Let me try to formulate (d) in a way that is more clearly objective in nature:
(d#) any beliefs that P has about God’s properties or actions are accepted as a result of God revealing those beliefs.
If we understand (d) in this way, as requiring that P’s beliefs about God have a certain kind of CAUSE, namely an act of divine revelation, then (d) could be satisfied ONLY IF God in fact exists and can perform actions that cause events or changes to occur.  But this would have the counter-intuitive implication that no Christian or Jew or Muslim has ever had ‘faith in God’ if it turns out that there is no God.   It seems to me that we skeptics and atheists are inclined to say that many religious believers have ‘faith in God’ even if we are completely convinced that there is no such being as God.  So, I don’t think the definition works on this objective interpretation of condition (d).
Here is a formulation of (d) that is more clearly a subjective one:
(d*) any beliefs that P has about God’s properties or actions are accepted by P because P believes that God has revealed those beliefs.
On this subjective interpretation of (d), it does not matter whether God exists or not.  So long as P believes that God exists and believes that God sometimes reveals truths to humans, then (d) could be satisfied even if it turns out that there is no such being as God (or even if there were a God who chose not to reveal theological truths to humans).